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THE ALTERNATIVE MEDICAL PRACTICE
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RIGHT OF PHYSICIANS TO USE
COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE
MEDICINE?
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INTRODUCTION

The early 1990s witnessed an explosion of the American
consumer's interest in complementary and alternative medicine
(CAM).'
In 1993, a survey published in the New England
Journal of Medicine (NEJM) sparked the attention of the entire
healthcare industry with a finding that more Americans
consulted CAM providers than conventional physicians. 2
According to the survey, consumers paid $10.3 billion in out-ofpocket expenses to CAM providers representing a large share of
the $23.5 billion paid in out-of-pocket expenses for all physicians'
services in the United States. 3 A follow-up survey conducted in
1997 indicated "dramatic increases in use and expenditures
associated with alternative medical care." 4 Researchers have
t The author is a Professor of Law at Syracuse University College of Law where
he teaches a course in Complementary and Alternative Medicine Law. He would
like to thank Andrea Rachko for her generous advice and review of earlier versions
and Anita Pelletier, Jessica Birkalhn, and Gloria Lee for their research assistance.
1 See generally Kathleen M. Boozang, Western Medicine Opens the Door to
Alternative Medicine, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 185 (1998) (discussing increased CAM use
and expenditures due to increased patient demand); David M. Eisenberg, Trends in
Alternative Medicine in the United States, 1990-1997, 280 JAMA 1569 (1998)
(discussing the expansion of CAM).
2 David M. Eisenberg, Unconventional Medicine in the United StatesPrevalence, Costs, and Patterns of Use, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 246, 251 (1993). The
survey was conducted in 1990.
3 Id. at 250-51.
4 Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1575. The study revealed that from 1990-1997
there was an increase of use of CAM from 33.8% to 42.1% and an increase in total
visits to CAM practitioners from 427 million to 629 million. Expenditures increased
45.2% and conservatively estimated at 21.2 billion in 1997 with 12.2 billion paid out
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estimated that consumer spending on CAM will grow by as much
as thirty percent annually. 5 Health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) and the broader insurance industry have also recognized
this consumer demand for alternative health care along with its
Kaiser Permonte, the
concomitant monetary expenditures.
largest HMO, Oxford Health Plans, Western Life, Mutual of
Omaha, and Blue Cross Blue Shield now offer some level of
6
reimbursement for alternative therapies.
In 1992, under the auspices of the National Institutes of
Health, 7 Congress authorized the establishment of what is now
called the National Center for Complementary and Alternative
Medicine (NCCAM)8 The primary purpose of NCCAM is "to
facilitate the evaluation of alternative medical treatment
From an initial budget of $3.5 million,
modalities." 9
congressional appropriations for the 2000 fiscal year have
increased to $68.4 million. 10

of pocket. In 1990, it was estimated that 60 million people used at least 1 of 16
alternative therapies as compared to 83 million in 1997. Id. at 1569.
5 See David M. Studdert et al., Medical MalpracticeImplications of Alternative
Medicine, 280 JAMA 1610 (1998). But see Chris Rauber, Open to Alternative:
Pressured by Consumers Demand, More Health Plans Are Embracing
Nontraditional Treatment Options, 50 MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 7, 1998, at 8
(noting that others have more conservatively estimated the annual growth rate at
fifteen percent).
6 See Aimee Doyle; Alternative Medicine and Medical Malpractice Emerging
Issues, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 533, 539 n.33 (2001); see also, Studdert, supra note 5, at
1610.
7 See id; see also Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); Boozang,
supra note 1, at 189; Doyle, supra note 6, at 538.
8 What was originally established as the Office of Alternative Medicine has
been renamed several times and is currently called the National Center for
Complementary and Alternative Medicine. See National Center for Complementary
Medicine, Important Events in NCCAM History, at
and Alternative
http://nccam.nih.gov/about/ataglance/timeline.htm (last modified May 23, 2002).
9 Kristen J. Josefek, Alternative Medicine's Roadmap to Mainstream, 26 AM.
J.L. & MED. 295, 296 n.13; see National Institutes of Health, NCCAM Legislative
Chronology, Mission, at http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/organization/NCCAM.
htm (last visited July 12, 2002); see also Lori B. Andrews, The Shadow Healthcare
System: Regulation of Alternative Health Care Providers, 32 HoUs. L. REv. 1273,
1288 (1996); Doyle, supra note 6, at 538.
10 See Doyle, supra note 6, at 538; Josefek, supra note 9, at 296. NCCAM's 2002
appropriation is $104.6 million. This figure reflects a 17.3% increase over the 2001
appropriation of $89.2 million. See National Center for Complementary and
Alternative Medicine, FY 2003 Budget, available at http://nccam.nih.gov/
abouttcongressional/2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
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Despite the tumultuous relationship between conventional
medicine and CAM," the medical community has begun to
seriously examine CAM and to incorporate it into mainstream
healthcare. "The American Medical Association (AMA) has
recognized the need for medical schools to respond to the
growing interest in alternative health care practices."'12
Approximately sixty percent of United States' medical schools
now offer courses in complementary or alternative medicine. 13
Research has shown that eighty percent of medical students and
seventy percent of family physicians wish to receive training in
CAM therapies, 14 and nearly sixty percent of conventional
physicians have either made referrals or are willing to refer their
patients to CAM practitioners. 15 Further, the Group on
Educational Affairs of the Association of American Medical
Colleges, the Society of Teachers of Family Medicine, and the
American Public Health Association have formed CAM special
16
interest groups.
11See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 211 (7th Cir. 1983); JOHN
ROBBINS, RECLAIMING OUR HEALTH: EXPLODING THE MEDICAL MYTH AND
EMBRACING THE SOURCE OF TRUE HEALING 7-9 (H J Kramer 1996); see also

Andrews, supra note 9, at 1288, 1291; Boozang, supra note 1, at 185; Josefek, supra
note 9, at 296-97.
12 Miriam S. Wetzel, Courses Involving CAM at United States' Medical Schools,
280 JAMA 784, 784 (1998).
13 See id. As of the fall of 1998 seventy-five of the 117 medical schools that
responded to the survey, conducted by Drs. Wetzel, Eisenberg, and Kaptchuk,
"reported offering elective courses in complementary or alternative medicine or
including these topics in required courses." Id.; see also Richard and Hinda
Rosenthal Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine, Complementary
and Alternative Medicine Course Taught at Unites States' Medical Schools, at
http://www.rosenthal.hs.columbia.edu/MDCourses.html
(last visited Mar. 26,
2003).
14 See CAM Facts: Complementary and Alternative Medicine in the United
States, at http'//www.healthlobby.com/confacts.html (citing Wayne B. Jonas,
Remarks from the NIH Office of Alternative Medicine (1997) (80% of medical
students want training in CAM)); Brian M. Berman, Physicians'Attitudes Toward
Complementary or Alternative Medicine: A Regional Survey, J. AM. BOARD FAM.
PRAC., Sept.-Oct. 1995 (70% of family physicians want training in CAM); see also
Wetzel, supra note 12, at 786.
15 See Berman, supra note 14, at 364-66; see also Doyle, supra note 6, at 534
(citing J. Borkan et al., Referrals for Alternative Therapies, 39 J. FAM. PRAC. 545
(1994)); Hassan Rifaat, A Closer Look: Integrating Alternative and Traditional
Medicine, 44 RISK MGMT. 62 (1997) (reporting that "[a] survey by the Office of
Alternative Medicine found that over half of the conventional physicians in the
United States have recommended or tried alternative medicine"); Wetzel, supra note
12, at 786.
16 Wetzel, supra note 12, at 784.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:75

The overwhelming consumer interest in CAM and
conventional medicine's courtship of CAM presents many
challenges for physicians who have integrated or may in the
future integrate CAM, in whole or in part, into their medical
practice.
Not surprisingly, courts, state legislators, and
administrative bodies have been increasingly involved in
defining the legal parameters of CAM. The differing views
underlying organized medicine and unorthodox healthcare
practice have led to a dilemma for legal decision makers. 17 This
professional rivalry has historically led courts, legislators, and
administrative bodies to examine CAM practices through the
perspective of conventional medicine.' 8 "The legal paradigm to
date thus mirrors biomedicine's historical view of holistic
practice as deviant, suspect, or 'on the fringe.' "19 At the core of
the lingering rivalry is conventional medicine's view that CAM's
20
efficacy remains largely unproven.
Despite the heated debate of the efficacy of CAM therapies,
physicians have integrated CAM therapies into their practices
either by performing the therapy themselves or by referring
their patients to a CAM practitioner. Malpractice liability and
exposure to disciplinary action for unprofessional conduct have
concerned these physicians, as well as those who are
contemplating the integration of CAM therapies into their
practice.
Part I of this Article examines state regulatory powers by
providing an overview of the physician's scope of practice. It
17 See MICHAEL H. COHEN, COMPLEMENTARY & ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE:
LEGAL BOUNDARIES AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 17-23 (1998); see also Wilk v.

Am. Med. Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 211 (7th Cir. 1983); Andrews, supra note 9, at 128889.
18 COHEN, supranote 17, at 18. For example, the standard applied by the courts
and state medical boards asks whether the physician's conduct was consistent with
prevailing acceptable medical practices.
19 Id. at 23.

20 Boozang, supra note 1, at 185 ("Alternative medicine's successful entry into
Western practice depends on convincing conventional medicine of the efficacy of
alternative treatments, a task that remains largely undone."). See generally id. at
185-93 (noting arguments against the integration of CAM by physicians); see also
Michael H. Cohen & David M. Eisenberg, Potential PhysicianMalpractice Liability
Associated with Complementary and Integrative Medical Therapies, 136 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 596 (2002) ("[P]hysicians reviewing the integration of CAM
therapies into conventional care should determine the extent to which the evidence
reported in the scientific and medical literature supports both safety and
efficacy.... ."); Studdert, supra note 5, at 1610.
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provides an analysis of the disciplinary procedures experienced
by physicians facing charges of unprofessional conduct arising
from their integration of CAM therapy. Particular attention is
given to specific CAM practices and the standard of care adopted
by state medical boards to determine if unprofessional conduct
has occurred. Also discussed is the permissible scope of the
investigation and the medical board's power to conduct a
comprehensive medical review and issue subpoenae duces tecum.
Part II offers both judicial and legislative proposals for reform.
This Article concludes that reforms are necessary to ensure the
right of physicians to use effective innovative medicine and to
protect patients' rights to choose their medical treatments.
This Article also provides a thorough discussion of the
various legal issues confronting physicians who have integrated
or are considering integrating CAM into their conventional
medical practice, in whole or in part, and it offers several
recommendations for providing greater protection to CAM
physicians who not only cause no harm to their patients but also
sincerely intend to facilitate their return to wellness.
I.

STATE REGULATION OF SPECIFIC CAM PRACTICES

The United States Supreme Court has held that the police
power of the states allows them to regulate the practice of
medicine in order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens. 2 1 Through this police power, states have passed
legislation controlling the health care profession by defining the
qualifications required to practice within the state.22 Each
state's legislation broadly defines the practice of medicine. 23 For
example, New York defines the practice of medicine as
"diagnosing, treating, operating or prescribing for any human
disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition,"24 and
California authorizes holders of a physician's and surgeon's
21 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889).
22

See N.Y. EDUC. LAW

§

6524 (McKinney 2001) (requirements to qualify for a

license as a physician); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2080-2099 (West 1998)
(requirements for a physician's or surgeon's certificate).
23 See Michael H. Cohen, Holistic Health Care: Including Alternative and
Complementary Medicine in Insurance and Regulatory Schemes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.

83, 90 (asserting that "broad definitions of 'practicing medicine' codify orthodox
medicine's historical dominance over the provision of health care").
24 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2001).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:75

certificate to "use drugs or devices in or upon human beings and
to sever or penetrate the tissues of human beings and to use any
and all other methods in the treatment of diseases, injuries,
deformities, and other physical and mental conditions." 25 A
license to practice medicine also requires physicians to comply
conduct.2 6
of professional
standard
with the state's
Unprofessional conduct may include matters such as
incompetence, negligence, breach of patient confidentiality,
practicing beyond the scope permitted by law, conviction of a
crime, and prohibited fee splitting.27
Legislation may also
include special provisions defining unprofessional conduct for the
practice of medicine specifically. 28 Many state regulations also
proscribe any departure from standards of acceptable and
29
prevailing medical practice.
Since the practice of medicine is broadly defined, physicians
are provided with the broadest scope of practice among health
care providers. 30 Physicians attempting to integrate a CAM
therapy into their conventional practice often learn, however,
that their scope of practice is not unlimited. In most reported
cases of CAM integration, the physicians risked having their
licenses suspended or revoked, even though their patients were
neither harmed nor complained to the medical board. In fact, in
several cases, the patients provided informed consent and
supported the physician before the medical board. These cases
can be divided into several types of CAM therapies, including
homeopathy, nutritional therapy, ozone and nutrition, and
chelation.
A.

Homeopathy

In Metzler v. New York State Board for ProfessionalMedical
Conduct, 31 a physician requested judicial review of a
25 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2051 (West 1998).
26 This standard is typically defined by enumerating conduct that is considered
to be unprofessional. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§ 29.1, 29.4
(McKinney 2000); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2234 (West 1998).
27 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§ 29.1, 29.4 (McKinney 2000).
28 See id. § 29.4.
29 See, e.g., In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 835 (N.C. 1990), (noting that North
Carolina statutory law, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(6) (1985), proscribes departure
from accepted medical standards).
30 See Cohen, supra note 23, at 90-91; see also COHEN, supra note 17, at 40.
31 203 A.D.2d 617, 610 N.Y.S.2d 334 (3d Dep't 1994).
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determination by the Administrative Review Board for
Professional Conduct (ARB) that revoked his license to practice
in New York.32 The ARB sustained the hearing committee's
findings that the physician did "not practice orthodox or
allopathic medicine but practice[d] homeopathy."33 Further, "the
[ciommittee noted that '[h]omeopathy is not recognized in New
York State as a separate branch of medicine nor is [the
petitioner] separately licensed as a homeopathic physician.' "34
The physician argued that the hearing committee and the ARB
applied the standard of care which was "applicable only to
orthodox or allopathic medicine rather than to the homeopathic
35
medicine" in which he engaged.
The physician also challenged the finding of misconduct on
the ground that the four patients whose care was at issue
36
consented to the physician's exclusive practice of homeopathy.
The appellate court found "such contention to be wholly without
merit because it is well settled that a patient's consent to or even
insistence upon a certain treatment does not relieve a physician
from the obligation of treating the patient with the usual
standard of care"37 and affirmed the ARB's decision to revoke the
38
physician's license.
In In re Guess,39 Dr. Guess was a licensed physician who
practiced family medicine in North Carolina. 40 The State Board
of Medical Examiners revoked Dr. Guess's license because he
integrated homeopathy into his medical practice. 41 The board
concluded that the "practice of homeopathy 'departs from and
does not conform to the standards of acceptable and prevailing
Id. at 617, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
Id., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335. The petitioner described "homeopathy" as "treating
the restrictions the person has in mastering life." Id., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
34 Id. at 618, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335. The committee concluded that the
physician's treatment of an AIDS patient who died from pneumocystic pneumonia
"did not meet the minimum standards of acceptable medical practice." Id., 610
N.Y.S.2d at 335.
35 Id., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
36 Id. at 619, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
37 Id., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (citations omitted). The facts in Metzler indicate
neither the specific conduct or lack of care that may have contributed to the death of
one patient nor whether any of the four patients complained to any medical board.
38 Id., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
39 393 S.E.2d 833, 834 (N.C. 1990).
40 Id. at 834.
32
33

41

Id. at 835.
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medical practice in... [the] State [of North Carolina]."42 The
trial court, court of appeals, and the dissenting justice on the
North Carolina Supreme Court maintained that the statutory
scheme was intended to protect the public from detrimental
conduct. 43 In coming to this conclusion, the dissent argued that
statutory protection did not attach to the mere integration of
CAM practices because "[tihe common thread running through
each of these [statutory] reasons for revocation of a [medical]
license is the threat or potential for harm to patients and the
public." 44 The majority of the North Carolina Supreme Court,
however, concluded that the legislature intended to protect the
public from the general risk of endangerment that "is inherent in
any practices which fail to conform to the standards of
'acceptable and prevailing' medical practice in North Carolina." 45
Neither the Metzler nor the Guess court defined what may be
"acceptable and prevailing medical practice." 46
B.

Nutritional Therapy

In Matter of Gonzalez v. New York State Department of
Health,47 a physician treated mostly "patients with advanced and
incurable cancer." 48 The Office of Professional Medical Conduct
(OPMC) brought charges against the physician for incompetence
42 Id. The North Carolina statute at issue, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(6) (1985),
stated that a departure from the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical
practice is unprofessional conduct " 'irrespective of whether or not a patient is
injured thereby.' " Id. at 836. There were no allegations of harm to any of Dr.
Guess's patients. Indeed, there was evidence that several patients who were unable
to obtain relief from conventional medicine found relief from Dr. Guess's
homeopathic treatments. Id. The dissenting justice remarked that Dr. Guess was "a
highly qualified practicing physician who use[d] homeopathic medicines as a last
resort when allopathic medicines are not successful." Id. at 841 (quoting N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-14(a)(6) (1985)).
43 Id. at 836. The dissenting justice enumerated the statutory basis upon which
a physician's license might be suspended or revoked. Id. at 840-41.
44 Id. at 840-41.
45 Id. at 837. Several physicians testified before the board that "homeopathy
was not an acceptable and prevailing system of medical practice in North Carolina."
Id. at 835. Dr. Guess had submitted evidence that at least three states and many
foreign countries recognize homeopathy. Id. The dissenting justice raised the issue
"of how the acceptable and prevailing practice can be improved in North Carolina if
we do not even consider what happens in other states and countries," Id. at 841.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 212-57 for the standards to be applied in
disciplinary proceedings.
47 232 A.D.2d 886, 648 N.Y.S.2d 827 (3d Dep't 1996).
48 Id. at 886, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
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and negligence based upon the physician's treatment of six
patients with the disease. 49 Each patient had either exhausted
or rejected conventional therapy.5 0 "The [h]earing [c]ommittee
ordered the suspension of petitioner's license to practice
medicine for three years but stayed the suspension subject to
petitioner's compliance with certain probationary conditions." 5 '
Like the court in Metzler,5 2 the Gonzalez court held that despite
a patient's consent, the physician was required to comply with "
'the usual standard of care."'5 3 In addition, the facts of neither
case indicated whether any patient was harmed or who filed the
54
complaints.
C.

Ozone and Nutrition
The physician in Atkins v. Guest5 5 treated cancer patients

with a combination of ozone therapy and nutritional
supplements.5 6 An emergency room physician filed a complaint
after Dr. Atkins sent his patient to the hospital following an
ozone treatment.5 7 The patient was treated "in a hyperbaric
chamber and was eventually released with no apparent side
effects or injuries."5 8

49 Id., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 829. The hearing committee found that the physician

failed

to "(1)

perform

appropriate

assessments....

(2)

perform

adequate

neurological evaluations .... (3) perform an adequate physical examination ....
(4)
obtain adequate laboratory or radiological evaluations... , (5) perform sufficient
follow-up monitoring... , and (6) perform sufficiently frequent follow-up
evaluations." Id. at 887, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
50 Id. at 886, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
51 Id. at 887, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 829. The conditions included supervision,
completion of a retraining program, and satisfaction of 200 hours of community
service. See id., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
52 See Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. Profl Conduct, 203 A.D.2d 617, 619, 610
N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (3d Dep't 1994).
53 Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 888, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
54 The applicable New York statute requires that the name of the complainant
is to be kept confidential. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(11)(a) (McKinney 1996).
However, on occasion, the court has indicated that the complainant was another
physician. See, e.g., Atkins v. Guest, 158 Misc. 2d 426, 427, 601 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993); infra text accompanying notes 224-42.
55 158 Misc. 2d 426, 601 N.Y.S.2d 235.
56 Id. at 427, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
57 Id. at 428, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
58 Id., 601 N.Y.S.2d at 236. "The hyperbaric chamber is more commonly known
as the decompression chamber, and is most often used to treat scuba divers
suffering from the bends.' "Id., 601 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
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Dr. Atkins moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum for the
patient's medical records issued by the OPMC.5 9 Dr. Atkins
claimed that the OPMC did not meet the necessary minimum
requirements for the issuance of a subpoena.6 0 He also pointed
out that the patient specifically requested, based on her
statutory confidentiality privilege, that her personal medical
records not be released. 6 1 The court denied the motion to quash
the subpoena and rejected Dr. Atkins's "assertion that he cannot
legally be found negligent or incompetent." 62 The court left the
determination of negligence or incompetence to the discretion of
63
the New York State Board for Professional Conduct.
D. Chelation
In State Board of Medical Examiners v. Rogers,64 Dr. Rogers
was ordered by the Brevard County Medical Association to
discontinue his employment of chelation treatment to remedy
arteriosclerosis. 65 After refusing to discontinue his use of
chelation treatments, the physician was expelled from the
Brevard County Medical Association. 66
Subsequent to the
expulsion, an administrative complaint was lodged against the
physician for unprofessional conduct. 67 The Florida Supreme
Court reviewed the nature and history of chelation therapy and
68
noted that many experts agreed that chelation was efficacious.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
determination that the Board of Medical Examiners' action
"unreasonably interfere[d] with Dr. Rogers' right to practice
medicine by curtailing the exercise of his professional judgment
to administer chelation therapy."69 The court acknowledged that
the state's power "to regulate the practice of medicine for the

59 Id., 601 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
60 Id. at 429, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
61 Id. at 428, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 236; see also N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 230(11)(a)

(McKinney 1996).
62 Atkins, 158 Misc. 2d at 431, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
63 Id. at 431, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
6 387 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 1980).
65 Id. at 937-38. Chelation therapy involves the use of intravenous injections to
treat the hardening of arteries. Id. at 938 n.2.
66 Id. at 938.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 939.
69 Id.
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70
benefit of the public health and welfare.., is not unrestricted."
The court concluded that the medical board's decision was not
reasonably related to the public health and welfare because of a
lack of evidence that chelation therapy was harmful. 71 The court
found that Dr. Rogers fully informed his patients about chelation
including the possibility of no improvement and noted that there
was no evidence of either fraud or deception by Dr. Rogers upon
72
his patients.

II.

STATE MEDICAL FREEDOM ACTS

Curiosity, if not outright interest in CAM, was aroused by
two studies published during the 1990s. 73

This recent trend

toward understanding and integrating CAM into mainstream
medicine follows on the heels of 150 years of strong opposition,
and in some cases hostility, to CAM. 74 Conventional medicine

practitioners, mostly through the American Medical Association,
75
have attempted to discredit the practices of midwives,
homeopaths, 76
chiropractors, 77
acupuncturists, 78
and
79
naturopaths.
Over the years, the AMA has succeeded in its early goals of
dominance in the field of medicine. Through the concerted
efforts of the AMA, all other healthcare providers were labeled
as cultists, charlatans, and quacks.80 Since the early 1900s, the
AMA's goal was to become an organization " 'whose power to
Id.
Id.
72 Id.
73 See Eisenberg, Trends in Alternative Medicine, supra note 4; Eisenberg,
UnconventionalMedicine, supra note 2.
74 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
75 See Andrews, supra note 9, at 1288; see also Bowland v. Municipal Court, 556
P.2d 1081, 1082 (Cal. 1976).
76 See Andrews, supra note 9, at 1288; see also In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 834
(N.C. 1990); Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. for Profl Med. Conduct, 203 A.D.2d 617, 610
N.Y.S.2d 334 (3d Dep't 1994).
77 See Andrews, supra note 9, at 1288; see also Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 719
F.2d 207, 211 (7th Cir. 1983).
78 See Andrews, supra note 9, at 1288; see also Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F.
Supp. 1038, 1039 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
79 See Andrews, supra note 9, at 1288; see also Idaho Ass'n of Naturopathic
Physicians v. FDA, 582 F.2d 849, 851 (4th Cir. 1978). Naturopathy is the use of
natural foods and medicines to assist the self-healing processes of the body. Id. at
850.
80 See Wilk, 719 F.2d at 211; see also Andrews, supra note 9, at 1292, 1294;
Boozang, supra note 1, at 212 n.63; Josefek, supra note 9, at 310 n.166.
70

71
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influence public sentiment [would] be almost unlimited, and
whose requests for desirable legislation [would] everywhere be
met with the respect which the politician always has for
organized votes.' "81
The current regulatory scheme of
healthcare providers, particularly in the areas of licensing, scope
of practice rules, and medical disciplinary actions, reflects the
powerful influence and dominance of biomedicine.8 2 Despite the
current increased interest by the biomedical community,
physicians who integrate CAM into their practice remain
vulnerable to the unfettered discretion of medical boards to
investigate, charge, and discipline them for practices that do not
83
conform to the acceptable and prevailing biomedical practice.
New York physicians who have been investigated by the
OPMC have faced financial devastation and irreparable loss of
reputation.8 4 In the past decade, legislators have taken notice of
the dual deprivation of the rights of patients to choose their
health care and the rights of physicians to choose innovative
therapies that effectively treat their patients. New York is one
of the first states to enact legislation intended to protect both the
rights of patients to choose and the rights of physicians to offer
CAM. 85 "Ultimately, by protecting the rights of nonconventional
81 COHEN, supra note 17, at 19 (quoting 36 JAMA 515 (1902)).
82 See generally id. at 21-22 (discussing recent broad interpretations of the

"practice of medicine").
83 See id. at 92-93. "The twin issues of physicians' vulnerability and medical
boards' unfettered discretion in disciplining physicians challenge medical freedom
and innovation and discourage a patient-centered approach that integrates
nonbiomedical alternatives." Id.
84 Burton Goldberg, Fight for Your Life: State Medical Boards Are Persecuting
Alternative Physicians for Trying Too Hard to Cure Their Patients, ALTERNATIVE
MED., Oct. 2002. 12-14. The author recognizes that New York Doctor Serafina
Corsello, a CAM physician, recently had her license revoked. As a result, it "has cost
her hundreds of thousands of dollars and nearly bankrupted her." Id. at 14; see also
New
York
City Hearings Before
the White House Commission on
Complementary /Alternative Medicine (Jan. 23, 2001) (testimony of Drs. Jennifer
Daniels, Serafma Corsello, and Charles Gant).
85 There are twelve states, including New York, that have passed laws to
protect the rights of nonconventional physicians as well as the right of citizens'
access to the medical care of their choice. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 08.64.326(a)(8)(A) (Michie 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-117 (2002); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 456.41 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42.1 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 112, § 7 (2002); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(4) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 230(1), 230(10)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(6) (1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.227 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 492(F),
493.1(M), 509.1 (D)(2) (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.190(1) (1995); 22 TEx. ADMIN.
CODE § 200.1-200.3 (West 1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.130.180(4) (2002).
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physicians throughout the misconduct process, this legislation
secures the rights and freedom of patients to choose their
medical treatments."8 6 The legislation provides for a disciplinary
process that includes peer review by a hearing committee to
determine the validity of charges and the appropriateness of
sanctions.8 7 Additionally, to ensure "that a physician charged
with misconduct receives fair consideration by those best
qualified to judge his or her practice and methods of treatment,"
88 the sponsors provided that the hearing committee should
consist of two physicians and one layperson.8 9
However, in the case of a physician who practices
nonconventional medicine--i.e., treatments which differ from
customary or prevailing approaches, such as homeopathy,
chelation therapy, herbal medicine and vitamin therapy-the
review process established in [the] statute may not always
provide for a fair and impartial hearing. Since there are no
nonconventional physicians who serve on the board for
professional medical conduct, no legitimate peer review exists
when issues involve clinical practice that is foreign, innovative,
or has been shown to be effective[,] but has not yet achieved
general acceptance in the United States. Rather, according to
the community of nonconventional physicians, they are judged
prejudicially by orthodox doctors who discount their treatments
and medical doctrines, and often impose upon them penalties
more severe than those assessed against conventional
physicians found guilty of equivalent misconduct charges.
Consequently, there is legitimate concern among practitioners
of nonconventional medicine that the existing professional
medical conduct process does not conform to case law which has
affirmed the rights of patients to choose such treatments. 90
Both houses of the New York State Legislature intended the
act to address "the potential for abuse [that] exists in a peer
review system that does not have any peers" 91 by assuring that

86 Memorandum from New York Senator Holland in Support of S.3636-2 (July
20, 1994) [hereinafter Holland Memo] (stating that "this legislation is designed to
safeguard patients' rights and guarantee legitimate due process for nonconventional
physicians"). See generally Memorandum from New York Assemblyman Colman in
Support of A.5411-C (July 18, 1994) [hereinafter Colman Memo].
87 Holland Memo, supra note 86.
88 Colman Memo, supra note 86, at 1.

89 Holland Memo, supra note 86.
90 Colman Memo, supra note 86, at 1-2.
91 Holland Memo, supra note 86.
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there would be constructive participation by nonconventional
physicians in the investigation and disposition of medical
misconduct charges against the nonconventional physician under
review.92
Despite the good intentions of New York legislators, neither
the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct
(BPMC), which includes the actions of OPMC, nor the New York
courts have provided adequate safeguards and rights to CAM
physicians and patients.
A.

DisciplinaryProcedures

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that "no state shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 93 Although
states have the police power to regulate the practice of medicine,
a license to practice medicine may only be denied or withdrawn
in accordance with procedures required by constitutional due
process. 94 Due process requires that statutes and regulations to
provide adequate notice of illegal conduct in order to enable
individuals to conform their behavior to the law. 95 Most states
delineate acts of professional misconduct that subject physicians
to sanctions for their violation. 96 New York is no exception. New
York Education Law enumerates forty-seven acts of professional
misconduct. 97 Professional misconduct for physicians include:

92 Id.
93

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

94 Doe v. Axelrod, 123 A.D.2d 21, 26, 510 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (1st Dep't 1986) ("A

license to practice medicine is a valuable property right which, although subject to
regulation under the state's police power, may only be denied or withdrawn under
procedures consonant with constitutional due process."); see also Keney v.
Derbyshire, 718 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 492 (1959)). The procedures used by the medical board in Keney included 'prior
notice, a formal hearing, right to counsel, prehearing discovery, affirmative case
presentation, witness cross-examination, and employment of rules of evidence." Id.
at 355.
95 Binenfeld v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 226 A.D.2d 935, 936, 640 N.Y.S.2d
924, 925 (3d Dep't 1996) ("It is a basic principle of due process that statutes and
regulations must give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited so that they may act accordingly.").
96 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6530, 6531 (McKinney 2001), N.C. GEN. STAT. §

90-14(a)(6) (1993); see also supra note 42.
97 Binenfeld, 226 A.D.2d at 936, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 925-26; N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
6530 (McKinney 2001).
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1. Obtaining [a medical] license fraudulently; 2. Practicing the
profession fraudulently or beyond its authorized scope; 3.
Practicing the profession with negligence on more than one
occasion; 4. Practicing the profession with gross negligence on a
particular occasion; 5. Practicing the profession with
incompetence on more than one occasion; 6. Practicing the
profession with gross incompetence; 7. Practicing the profession
while impaired by alcohol, [ofi drugs ... ; 9. (a) Being convicted
of committing an act constituting a crime .... 98

Pursuant to Public Health Law section 230, the BPMC was
created to investigate and impose discipline for professional
misconduct as enumerated in New York Education Law sections
6530 and 6531. 99 The BPMC, through the OPMC, is permitted to
initiate an investigation but is required to "investigate each
complaint received regardless of the source." 10 0 The OPMC
director is required to review a preliminary report to determine
if it "reasonably appears to reflect physician conduct warranting
further investigation." 10 1 In the event that a reviewed case
which is referred to an investigation committee involves issues of
clinical practice, medical experts, including experts "dedicated to
the advancement of nonconventional medical treatments," are to
10 2
be consulted.
When a preliminarily investigated case is referred to an
investigation committee, the targeted physician may obtain a
personal interview before the OPMC to explain the issues being
investigated. 03 The opportunity for such an interview is a
prerequisite to the convening of a BPMC investigation
committee. 04
The director of OPMC must obtain "the
concurrence of a majority of an investigation committee" before
ultimately deciding that a hearing is warranted. 105
If the director determines after consultation with an
investigation committee that: (A) evidence exists of a single
incident

of

negligence

or

incompetence ...

;

(B)

a

recommendation was made by a county medical society or the

98

N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530 (McKinney 2001).

99 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(1) (McKinney 2001).
100Id. § 230(10)(a)(i).
101

Id.

102 Id. §
103 Id. §
104 Id.
105 Id.

230(10)(a)(ii).
230(10)(a)(iii).

§ 230(10)(a)(iv).
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medical society of the [sitate of New York that warrants further
review; ...

the director...

shall be authorized to conduct a

comprehensive review of patient records of the licensee and
such office records of the licensee as are related to said
determination. 106
The charges must state "clearly and concisely the material
facts" underlying the complaint. 0 7 The physician is entitled to
service of the charges and notice of the hearing. 0 8 The hearing
is conducted by a three-member hearing committee that consists
of two physicians and one lay person. 10 9 A request may be made
to the ARB to review the hearing committee's determination. 110
The physician under review may also appeal the hearing
committee's determination to the Appellate Division, Third
Department."'
However, the "standard of review... is
11
2
stringent."
The appellate division will only consider whether
the determination "was made in violation of lawful procedure,
was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious or
was an abuse of discretion." 113 If the physician is found guilty of
professional misconduct, the penalties that may be imposed
include suspension, revocation, or fine. 114
In appropriate
circumstances, a physician may be required to receive further
education or perform community service. 115 New York courts
have held that the penalty imposed is not intended to punish the
physician, but rather to protect the public health and welfare. 16

106

Id.

Id. § 230(10)(b).
Id. § 230(10)(c), (d).
109 Id. § 230(6).
110 Id. § 230(1)(i).
111 Id. § 239(c)(5). All such appeals are submitted only to the Appellate
Division, Third Department.
112 Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 889, 648 N.Y.S.2d
107

108

827, 831 (3d Dep't 1996).
113

Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. for Profl Med. Conduct, 203 A.D.2d 617, 619, 610

N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (3d Dep't 1994); see Bogdan v. N.Y. Bd. for Profl Med. Conduct,
195 A.D.2d 86, 606 N.Y.S.2d 381 (3d Dep't 1993).
114 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 230(a)(1), (2), (4), (7) (McKinney 1996).
115 Id. § 230(a)(8), (9).
116 See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 199 (1898) (regarding a medical

disciplinary matter); Bell v. Bd.of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 295 N.Y. 101, 109; 65
N.E.2d 184, 188 (1945); Matter of Cowan, 110 A.D.2d 53, 56, 493 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10 (1st
Dep't 1985) (regarding a lawyer disciplinary matter); see also Colo. State Bd.of Med.
Exam'r v. Reiner, 786. P.2d 499, 500 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
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Procedural Issues

The BMPC is required to investigate every complaint that it
receives. 1 7 The power of the BMPC to investigate, however, is
not limited to a single complaint received. 118 It has such wide
latitude that it may extend the investigation beyond the facts
and specifics of the initial complaint. 119 This means that,
hypothetically, if a conventional physician makes a complaint to
the BMPC that alleges Dr. A is using nutrients to treat patient
Y's illness, the BMPC has the discretion to investigate any of Dr.
A's patients. Additionally, the BMPC may investigate Dr. A's
general medical practice, including such matters as the
frequency of follow-up visits and general monitoring, billing
procedures, and patient record keeping, to determine if there are
120
any variations from the standard conventional medical care.
In this context, it is worth noting that these complaints need not
be--and in the case of CAM physicians typically are not-from
12 1
the patient but from other physicians.
Following the concurrence of a majority of the investigation
committee and consultation with the executive director of the
BPMC, the OPMC director may determine that a hearing is
122
warranted and direct that charges be prepared.
In a typical case, the OPMC requests that the physician
provide specific records.
Most often the request is for a
particular patient's file. 123 Even if the physician cooperates by
providing the requested documents, the OPMC is authorized to
conduct a comprehensive medical review (CMR). 124 At this point,
117See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

118See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also Alter v. N.Y. Dep't of
Health, State Bd. for Prof'l Med. Conduct, 145 Misc.2d 393, 395, 546 N.Y.S.2d 746,
748 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989).
119 See Alter, 145 Misc. 2d at 395, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 748.

120 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 232 A.D.2d 866, 648
N.Y.S.2d 827 (3d Dep't 1996); Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. for Profl Med. Conduct, 203
A.D.2d 617, 610 N.Y.S.2d 334 (3d Dep't 1994); Alter, 145 Misc.2d at 395, 546
N.Y.S.2d at 748. Theoretically, the BMPC may investigate for any statutorily
defined medical misconduct. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
121 See Studdert, supra note 5, at 1610. The authors reviewed malpractice

claims against CAM practitioners other than physicians and concluded that the
claims against CAM practitioners were relatively infrequent and of less severity.
122See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
123 See Alter, 145 Misc.2d at 395, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 748; Dombroffv. State Bd. for

Profl. Med. Conduct, 131 Misc.2d 472, 473, 500 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1986).
124 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. The director of the OPMC is

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:75

the OPMC may order the physician to provide the patient's files
and office records beyond the specifics of the original
complaint. 125 If the physician refuses to produce the requested
documents, the OPMC may seek an order by a New York State
26
Supreme Court justice to compel compliance.
The court shall not grant the application unless it finds that (i)
there was a reasonable basis for issuance of the director's order
and (ii) there is reasonable cause to believe that the records
sought are relevant to the director's order. The court may deny
1 27
the application or grant the application in whole or in part.
In alternative to an order by the OPMC pursuant to Public
Health Law section 230(10)(o) to produce certain documents, a
subpoena for those documents may be served upon the
physician. 2s Prior to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum,
129
the executive secretary of the BPMC must obtain approval
130
from a committee of two physicians and one lay person.
The
legislative mandate that requires prior approval for any
subpoena provides additional protection to physicians and others
who are the subject of the subpoena. 131 This is "a check 'not
provided in the legislation creating many administrative
agencies.'"132
Due to limits on the scope of administrative
investigations, the physician may move, before a New York
Supreme Court justice, pursuant to CPLR section 2304, to quash
the subpoena based upon the appropriateness of the
investigation. 133

authorized to conduct a comprehensive review if, after consultation with an
investigation committee, it is determined that certain statutory conditions exist.
125 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text; see also Alter, 145 Misc.2d
at 395, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 748; Dombroff, 131 Misc.2d at 473, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
126 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(10)(o) (McKinney 1996).
127

Id.

Id. § 230(10)(k)(1). In order to issue the subpoena, the executive secretary of
the BPMC must obtain the prior approval of a BPMC committee on professional
conduct. Id.; see Shankman v. Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 535 N.E.2d 1323, 1324,
538 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (1989); Dombroff, 131 Misc.2d at 474, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
129 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 230(6) (McKinney 1996).
130 Id. § 230(10)(k); see also Shankman, 73 N.Y.2d at 205, 535 N.E.2d at 1324,
538 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
131 See Dombroff, 131 Misc.2d at 474, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
132 Id., 500 N.Y.S.2d at 619 (quoting Levin v. Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d 35, 47, 449
N.E.2d 730, 737, 462 N.Y.S.2d 836, 842 (1983) (Simons, J., dissenting)).
133 Levin v. Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d 35, 38, 449 N.E.2d 730, 731, 462 N.Y.S.2d
836, 837 (1983).
128
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The state legislature cannot "confer upon an executive an
arbitrary and unbridled discretion as to the scope of his
investigation."1 34 "It is ancient law -that no agency of government
may conduct an unlimited and general inquisition into the
affairs of persons within its jurisdiction solely on the prospect of
possible violations of law being discovered, especially with
respect to subpoenas duces tecum."135 A motion to quash a
subpoena duces tecum issued by the BPMC requires that the
BPMC demonstrate to the court that there is "a showing that
there exists 'some basis for inquisitorial action'" or, more
specifically, "a threshold showing of the authenticity of the
complaint as warranting investigation."1 36
Moreover, the
documents that the government agency seeks to obtain must
"have some relevancy and materiality to the matter under
investigation."1 37 The requirement for a "minimum threshold
foundation" to support the BPMC's issuance of a subpoena will
138
vary from case to case.
There is, however, a basic "requirement that there be prima
facie proof of a justifiable basis for a good faith investigation of
professional misconduct." 139 The bona fide authenticity of the
complaint and subsequent investigation
may relate to the reliability of the complainant; it may be
shown by the substance of the complaint. Specific detail as to
identification of the complainant, some evidence of his good
faith or reliability, disclosure of the basis for his knowledge of
the substance of the complaint, with dates to establish its
currency, and some revelation of the substance of the complaint

134Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y. 212, 217, 197 N.E. 220, 222 (1935); see also
A'Hearn v. Comm. on Unlawful Practice of Law of N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, 23
N.Y.2d 916, 918, 246 N.E.2d 166, 167, 298 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (1969); La Belle Creole
Int'l v. Att'y-Gen. of N.Y., 10 N.Y.2d 192, 196, 176 N.E.2d 705, 707, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1,
4 (1961).
135A'Hearn, 23 N.Y.2d at 918, 246 N.E.2d at 167, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 316 (citations
omitted); see also Murawski, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 41, 449 N.E.2d at 733, 462 N.Y.S.2d at

839.
136 Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 41, 449 N.E.2d at 733, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 839.

137Carlisle, 268 N.Y. at 218, 197 N.E. at 222; see also Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at
40-41, 449 N.E.2d at 732-33, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 838-39.
138Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 40, 449 N.E.2d at 732, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
139 Id. at 41, 449 N.E.2d at 733, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 839; see also Matter of BU 9104-1356A, 186 A.D.2d 1054, 1054, 588 N.Y.S.2d 954, 954 (4th Dep't 1992); Matter of

BU 90-09-2400, 184 A.D.2d 1028, 1029, 584 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (4th Dep't 1992).
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will normally suffice, but all or most of this data may not be
necessary.

40

"Sufficient authenticating detail may be found in the
complaint itself; if not, it must be independently supplied."'
The BPMC must provide written notice to the physician of an
application pursuant to Public Health Law section 230(10)(o).142
The good faith requirement in support of that application or the
BPMC's request to compel compliance with a subpoena duces
tecum may be submitted for an in camera court review. This
review assesses whether the complaint is authentic and of
sufficient substance to warrant an investigation. 143 If the
140Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 42, 449 N.E.2d at 733-34, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 839-40.
The court in Murawski footnoted here that "[i]f the issuing agency demonstrates the
delicacy of a particular investigation or the risk of and consequences attendant on
premature disclosure, it may be appropriate to take proof of the threshold
foundation in camera." Id. at 42 n.4, 449 N.E.2d at 734 n.4, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 840 n.4
(quoting Matter of Sussman v. N.Y. State Organized Crime Task Force, 39 N.Y.2d
227, 233, 347 N.E.2d 638, 642, 383 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280 (1976)). Sussman involved a
multi-county investigation into organized crime activities. The supreme court
attempted to balance the interests of the attorney general to engage in difficult and
sensitive investigations with "the interests of witnesses in their legitimate
protection." Sussman, 39 N.Y.2d at 232, 347 N.E.2d at 641, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 279.
Because of this balancing of interests, the Sussman court observed "that there may
be instances, perhaps few in number, in which the delicacy of the particular
investigation or the risk of and consequences attendant on premature disclosure
may be such that it will be appropriate to employ specially limited, in camera...
procedures in which to receive the Deputy Attorney-General's proof." Id. at 233, 347
N.E.2d at 642, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
141 Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 42, 449 N.E.2d at 734, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
142 See Shankman v. Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 203, 206-07, 535 N.E.2d 1323, 132425, 538 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784-85 (1989); Tanner v. Dr. A., 228 A.D.2d 238, 239, 644
N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (1st Dep't 1996); Lepley v. Health Office of Profl Med. Conduct, 190
A.D.2d 556, 557, 593 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (1st Dep't 1993).
143 Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 41-42, 449 N.E.2d at 733, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 839; see
Tanner, 228 A.D.2d at 239, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 21; Lepley, 190 A.D.2d at 557, 593
N.Y.S.2d at 236; Alter v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, State Bd. for Profl Med.
Conduct, 145 Misc. 2d 393, 395, 546 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989);
Dombroffv. State Bd. for Profl Med. Conduct, 131 Misc. 2d 472, 474, 500 N.Y.S.2d
617, 619 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986); see also Atkins v. Guest, 158 Misc. 2d 426,
430-31, 601 N.Y.S.2d 234, 237-38 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993). The courts routine
use of in camera reviews of the BMPC's good-faith requirement in their
investigations of physicians appears inconsistent with the Court of Appeals
observation in Murawski and Sussman that there may be instances, even if only a
few, that necessitate an in camera review. These cases do not indicate whether the
investigations were delicate or if there were any risks related to premature
disclosure. At the time the Court of Appeals decided Murawski, the court was fully
aware of the confidentiality requirements of Public Health Law section 230(a)(ii).
The court, however, did not require that all such applications be reviewed in
camera. See Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 41, 449 N.E.2d at 733, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
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authenticity of the complaint has not been demonstrated by the
BPMC, the subpoena duces tecum will be quashed. 144 In that
circumstance, the court need not decide whether the subpoenaed
145
materials were relevant to the investigation.
In the event that the court orders the physician to comply
with the OPMC's order 146 or with a subpoena duces tecum, the
147
physician is obligated to provide the requested documents.
The failure to provide the documents, to permit a CMR, or
otherwise to cooperate with the investigation may result in the
148
suspension of the physician's license.
2.

Fairness and Equity

The Alternative Medical Practice Act (AMPA) was enacted
in 1994 in part to ensure fairness for nonconventional physicians
in a peer review disciplinary system. Prior to the legislation
there were no nonconventional peers in the system available to

Additionally, the targeted physician should be permitted to be aware of the basis for
the BPMC's request for secrecy and be given the opportunity to respond. In Atkins,
the name of the complainant, an emergency room doctor, and the patient were
known to the physician and the general public. Atkins, 158 Misc. 2d at 430-31, 601
N.Y.S.2d at 237-38. Despite this, the court still held that an in camera court review
was required. Id. at 431-32, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 238-39. The court maintained that
even though the patient's and complainant's names were known, it did "not justify
the public release of the Patient's hospital records, the complaint by the
complaining doctor or a laundry list of treatments the Patient received." Id. at 431,
601 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
'14 See Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 42, 449 N.E.2d at 734, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
145See id., 449 N.E.2d at 734, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 840 The court noted that it
would be inappropriate to consider the issue of relevancy because, in part, it would
require an examination of the statutory language contained in the Public Health
Law section 230(10)(k) that authorizes the issuance of a subpoena "with reference to
a matter within the scope of the inquiry or the investigation being conducted by the
board." Id. at 39 n.1, 449 N.E.2d at 732 n.1, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 838 n.1. A review of the
reported cases did not reveal any case that examined the meaning to be given to the
"scope of the inquiry or the investigation." Id. at 43, 449 N.E.2d at 734, 462
N.Y.S.2d at 840.
146See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(10)(o) (McKinney 1991); see also supra
notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
147 Of course, the physician does have the right to appeal the order to the
appellate division. See, e.g., Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 38, 449 N.E.2d at 731, 462
N.Y.S.2d at 837; Tanner, 228 A.D.2d at 239, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 21 (physician appealed
a ruling from the supreme court to the appellate division); Atkins, 158 Misc. 2d at
428, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 236 (physician appealed to the supreme court to quash the
subpoena duces tecum); Alter, 145 Misc. 2d at 394, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (physician
appealed to the supreme court to quash the subpoena duces tecum).
148 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(10)(a)(4) (McKinney 1991).
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complete the review. 149 The AMPA added two nonconventional
physicians to the BPMC 50 to guarantee that a nonconventional
"physician charged with misconduct receives fair consideration
by those best qualified to judge his or her practice and methods
of treatment." 151 This guarantee of fair consideration was to be
achieved by the constructive participation of the nonconventional
physicians "in the investigation and disposition of misconduct
cases involving issues of clinical practice." 152 To implement the
legislative intent, a nonconventional physician should be
appointed to the investigation committee or the hearing
committee or the administrative review board (ARB), or all of
these groups. Constructive participation could be achieved by
requiring consultation with a nonconventional medical expert
where issues of clinical practice are involved. 153 The New York
courts, however, have not required any participation by the
nonconventional physicians on the BPMC investigation or
hearing committees or on the ARB. 154 It is less clear whether the
New York courts will require nonconventional medical experts in
cases implicating clinical practice issues to participate in the
activities of these groups.
In three cases decided prior to the 1994 enactment of the
AMPA, physicians raised the statutory requirement to consult
nonconventional medical physicians. In two of those cases,
osteopathic physicians claimed that the statute required that an
osteopath be a member of the hearing committee. 155
In
149 See Holland Memo, supra note 86 and accompanying text; Colman Memo,
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
150 The number of physicians on the BPMC was an apparent compromise. The
senate sponsor sought the addition of three nonconventional physicians to the
BPMC. See Holland Memo, supra note 86.
151 See Holland Memo, supra note 86.
152 See supra note 151.
153 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(10)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1991).
The
nonconventional medical "[elxperts may be made available by... New York state
medical associations dedicated to the advancement of nonconventional medical
treatments." Id.
154 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 888, 648
N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (3d Dep't 1996); Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd.for Profl Med. Conduct,
203 A.D.2d 617, 619, 610 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (3d Dep't 1994).
155 See Amarnick v. Sobol, 173 A.D.2d 914, 916, 569 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (3d
Dep't 1991); Rosenberg v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 96 A.D.2d 651, 652,
466 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (3d Dep't 1983). An osteopath is a doctor who treats
osteopathy, a "disease of [the] bone." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1597 (3d ed. 1993).
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15 6
Rosenberg v. Board of Regents of the University of New York,
the osteopath argued that "his constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process of law were violated because no
osteopath served on the hearing panel." 157 In Amarnick v.
Sobel,158 the osteopath asserted that he "did not receive a fair
In both cases, the
hearing before an unbiased panel."1 59
Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the "Public
Health Law § 230(6) does not.., require the hearing committee
to have a physician on the panel who specializes in the charged
physician's area of expertise." 160 The third case involved a
In Metzler, the
physician who practiced homeopathy. 16 1
physician contended that the findings of the hearing committee
1 62
and the ARB were "the result of a bias against homeopathy."
After finding that the physician failed to provide any persuasive
evidence of bias, the court further found "that there is no
requirement that members of the [ciommittee or the [r]eview
[bloard be practitioners of the same specialty as the physician
under review, much less that they be adherents to the same
philosophy of medicine." 63
Finally, in Gonzalez, 164 a case decided after the AMPA was
passed, a physician who specialized in nutritional therapy to
treat advanced and incurable cancer patients, argued that the
AMPA mandated "that he [was] entitled to a new hearing before
a [hearing [ciommittee which consists of at least one
nonconventional physician." 65 In dicta, the Appellate Division,
Third Department stated that "the legislation does not
guarantee petitioner, as a nonconventional physician, that a
nonconventional physician will be on the [h]earing [c]ommittee

156
157

158

96 A.D.2d 651, 466 N.Y.S.2d 743 (3d Dep't 1983).
Rosenberg, 96 A.D.2d at 652, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
173 A.D.2d 914, 569 N.Y.S.2d 780 (3d Dep't 1991).

159 Amarnick, 173 A.D.2d at 916, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
160 Id., 569 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (citingRosenberg, 96 A.D.2d at 652, 466 N.Y.S.2d at

745).
161

See Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 617, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335; supra notes 32-38 and

accompanying text.
162 Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 619, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
Id., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The court cited to its previous decisions in
Rosenberg and Amarnick. See id., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
163

164

See Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 648 N.Y.S.2d

827 (3d Dep't 1996); supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
165 Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 887, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
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which determines his case."166 The court noted that all the law
required was that there be at least two nonconventional
physicians among the eighteen physicians on the BPMC.167
Public Health Law section 230(1) does not mandate that
there be nonconventional physician representation on the
particular hearing committee reviewing the charges against a
nonconventional physician. The legislative intent, however, is to
promote "greater participation by nonconventional physicians in
the investigation and disposition of misconduct cases involving
issues of clinical practice." 6 8 Nonconventional physicians and
the public commonly perceive that nonconventional physicians
are judged prejudicially. 169 This perception will continue unless
either
a
nonconventional
physician
BMPC
member
constructively participates in the particular investigation or
hearing committee or both, or a peer medical expert is consulted.
Despite the clear legislative intent, New York physicians
continue to be subjected to a process that denies them "fair
consideration by those best qualified to judge [their] practice and
methods of treatment."1 70 The following discussion of the cases
of two physicians who are currently undergoing the disciplinary
process illustrates the lack of a legitimate peer review process.
166Id. at 888, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830. The physicians' hearing was completed on
March 8, 1994 and the hearing committee's decision was effective on June 8, 1994.

Because the AMPA was effective as of July 26, 1994, the court concluded that "in
the absence of any indication of legislative intent to provide retroactivity ... the
legislation should only be applied prospectively." Id., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
167Id., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
168 Colman Memo, supra note 86, at 1 (supporting the AMPA).
169 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 84, at 12. "While the public clamors for more

access to alternative medical therapies, alternative physicians are still being singled
out by state medical boards. New York might be the worst offender." New York City
Hearings Before the White House Commission on Complementary/Alternative
Medicine (Jan. 23, 2001) (testimonies of Drs. Daniels, Corsello, and Gant, and
Arnold Gold); see also Holland Memo, supra note 86; Colman Memo, supra note 86.

The legislative memoranda clearly expressed the intent to reduce, if not eliminate,
the potential abuse in the disciplinary process in order to protect patients' rights to
access

CAM therapies, and nonconventional physicians would receive legitimate

due process. See also COHEN, TOWNSEND LETTER FOR DOCTORS AND PATIENTS, Part

One: Introduction, Aug.-Sept., 2001, Part Two: Complementary and Alternative

Physicians, Oct., 2001, Part Three: Medical Policies and the Reform of the OPMC,
Jan., 2002, Part Four: Reforming New York's OPMC: Curative or Cosmetic
Surgery?, July, 2002; A CONSUMER FOR MEDICAL CHOICE REPORT, THE WAR
AGAINST ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE: How MAINSTREAM MEDICINE is TRYING TO
DESTROY COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE (Quicksilver Press 2002).

170 See Holland Memo, supra note 86; Colman Memo, supra note 86; see also

Cohen, supra note 169.
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Dr. Serafina Corsello was charged with gross negligence and
gross incompetence 171 for ordering inappropriate and excessive
medical testing and treatment. 172 In Dr. Corsello's case, the
OPMC consulted a conventional physician expert to review the
facts in support of the complaint. "The expert ...stated in his
written report that he ha[d] virtually no knowledge about
alternative medicine, and despite extensive efforts, including
seeking judicial intervention before a New York supreme court
justice, Dr. Corsello has not had an alternative medical provider
173
review her records for investigative purposes."
In another recent case, Dr. Jennifer Daniels's license to
practice medicine was indefinitely suspended based on her
unwillingness to allow a comprehensive medical review under
Public Health Law section 230(10), in violation of N.Y Education
Law section 6530(15). 174 Initially, Dr. Daniels's was served with
a request to provide a particular patient's records. Apparently,
the diabetic patient had disregarded Dr. Daniels' treatment
advice by engaging in a one-week alcohol drinking binge. As a
result, the patient required emergency hospital care. 175 Dr.
Daniels fully complied with the patient's record request and
additionally provided written statements from other physicians
who had reviewed the patient's records. These physicians opined
that the treatment of this patient was in compliance with
6
standard conventional practices.17

171 See Corsello Briefs and Fact Sheet (on file with author). Dr. Corsello has
practiced CAM for more than thirty-five years. She is the co-founder of the

Foundation for the Advancement of Innovative Medicine. She was also one of the
twenty-five physicians chosen by the National Institutes of Health to participate in
the formation of the Office of Alternative Medicine, currently NCCAM., See supra
note 7; see also Goldberg, supra note 84.
172 See Corsello Briefs and Fact Sheet, supra note 171.
173 Corsello Brief 11 (Jan. 13, 2002) (on file with author). It was argued that the
refusal of the NYS Department of Health to implement Public Health Law section
230(10)(a)(ii) "exhibited a pattern of bias and a refusal to give a fair hearing to an
alternative medical provider." Id.
174 See Briefs of Dr. Daniels and Counsel for the Bureau of Professional Medical

Conduct Submitted to the ARB (on file with author).
175Although complaints are confidential pursuant to Public Health Law section
230(10)(a), it is reasonable to assume that an emergency room physician filed the
complaint with the OPMC.

176 Dr. Daniels practice mostly consists of conventional medicine. However,
when appropriate she integrates nutritional supplements into the prevailing and
acceptable medical practice. The OPMC alleged that Dr. Daniels was incompetent in
her treatment of this one patient who was recently diagnosed with diabetes.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.77:75

Dr. Daniels's experience evidences several procedural
irregularities that lend credence to CAM physicians' perception
of prejudicial treatment by the BPMC. Public Health Law
section 230(1O)(o)177 and several New York court decisions
require that there be a reasonable basis for conducting a
178
comprehensive review of patients' records and office records.
The extent of the actual investigation of Dr. Daniels's conduct by
the OPMC is unclear. It seems that an interview of the patient,
and perhaps the hospital emergency room records, would have
revealed the patient's gross deviation from the prescribed
treatment plan. A review of the same information by a medical
expert would also have revealed that the patient's medical
emergency was attributable to the patient's alcohol binging
rather than the addition of nutritional supplements to the
patient's treatment plan. 179 Lastly, the CMR was based upon a
single complaint of alleged incompetence.
Although Public
New York Public Health Law states:
Where the director has issued an order for a comprehensive medical
review of patient records and office records pursuant to subparagraph four
of paragraph (a) of this subdivision and the licensee has refused to comply
with the director's order, the director may apply to a justice of the supreme
court, in writing, on notice to the licensee, for a court order to compel
compliance with the director's order. The court shall not grant the
application unless it finds that (i) there was a reasonable basis for issuance
of the director's order and (ii) there is reasonable cause to believe that the
records sought are relevant to the director's order.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(10)(o).
In the event that the physician is served with a subpoena duces tecum for patients'
and office records, Murawski requires that there be a preliminary showing of
justifiable basis for a good-faith investigation as a prerequisite to the issuance of
subpoenas by the BPMC. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text. Dr.
Daniels's procedural history does not fit into either Public Health Law section
230(10)(o) or Murawski. Subsequent to receipt of the director's order for a CMR, Dr.
Daniels' attorney erroneously brought an Article 78 proceeding to declare the
method of conducting a CMR as illegal. The BPMC cross moved for an order to
compel compliance pursuant to Public Health Law section 230(10)(o). The supreme
court justice ruled that the Article 78 proceeding was time barred by the statute of
limitation and thereby granted the cross motion. Daniels v. Office of Profl Med.
Count (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County Jan. 9, 2001) (J. Murphy) (unpublished decision,
on file with author).
178 See Tanner v. Dr. A., 228 A.D.2d 238, 239, 644 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (1st Dep't
1996); Alter v. N.Y. State Bd. for Profl Conduct, 145 Misc.2d 393, 395, 546 N.Y.S.2d
746, 748 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989).
179 It is unclear whether OPMC consulted a medical expert and, if so, what the
nature of the report was. Dr. Daniels, however, did submit statements by
conventional physicians who did evaluate her treatment plan for the patient. See
supra note 174.
177
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Health Law section 230(10)(a)(4) and case law 80 permit a CMR
if evidence of a single incident of negligence exists, in Dr.
Daniels case, it is dubious whether there was evidence to support
any negligence at all.' 8 ' More importantly, physicians, such as
Dr. Daniels, feel persecuted when the OPMC seeks to review any
18 2
and all office records on the basis of one unfounded complaint.
The AMPA recognized the importance of permitting
physicians to practice "legitimate nonconventional medical
treatments."18 3
"Legitimate" was defined as "[e]ffectively
treat[ing] human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical
condition." 18 4 The BPMC and the New York courts have
disregarded the clear legislative mandate that nothing contained
in "[airticle 131 of the Education Law, which deals with the
practice of medicine ...shall be construed to affect or prevent a

licensed physician from using" effective nonconventional medical
care. 85 The BPMC and the courts have construed article 131 of
the Education Law in such a way as to prevent the effective use
of nonconventional medical care by physicians.
For example, a complaint might be filed by a conventional
physician alleging that another physician has deviated from the
prevailing and acceptable standard of care by the use of a
nonconventional treatment. The OPMC would be required to
investigate the validity of the complaint. 8 6 The OPMC would
then request that the targeted physician provide the patient's
records, which would likely confirm the physician's use of a
nonconventional treatment.
In order to give nonconventional physicians the safeguards
envisioned by the enactment of AMPA, the effectiveness of the
180 See, e.g., Tanner, 228 A.D.2d at 239, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
181 Because complaints are strictly confidential, neither the complainant nor

the nature of the complaint is known. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(11)(a). It is
reasonable, however, to assume that the initial complaint indicated that Dr. Daniels
treated a diabetic patient in whole or in part with nutritional supplements.
182 Some CAM physicians are of the opinion that a complaint based upon an
alternative treatment is a pretext for the OPMC to attempt to uncover other more
technical violations such as failure to properly maintain patient records, failure to
adequately monitor patients, or failure to perform adequate diagnostic tests. See
supra note 47. Ironically, Dr. Corsello's charges were primarily based upon
excessive tests and treatments. See Corsello Briefs and Fact Sheet, supra note 171.
183 Holland Memo, supranote 86, at 1 (supporting the AMPA).
184 Id.

185 Id.; see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(4)(e) (McKinney 1994); Colman Memo,
supra note 86; Holland Memo, supra note 86.
186 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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nonconventional treatment should be determined before a CMR
is ordered or a disciplinary hearing is held.
Absent a
determination of the treatment's effectiveness, the minimum
threshold required by the Murawski guidelines or the reasonable
basis requirement of Public Health Law section 230(10)(o) easily
would be satisfied. 8 7 Because the complainant is a physician,
his reliability would not be questioned by the court.38 Similarly,
the substance of the complaint need not be questioned by the
court because it would be presented by the complaining
physician together with a supporting affidavit by the OPMC
stating that the targeted physician's conduct deviated from the
prevailing and acceptable standard of care.18 9 Therefore, a
motion to compel compliance with either a CMR 190 or a subpoena
duces tecum' 9 ' will always be granted by the court.
Although "the target physician is provided with notice and
an opportunity to be heard prior to turning over the requested
documents," 92 the opportunity is severely limited. All of the
documentation in support of the OPMC's request to compel
compliance would be reviewed by the court in camera. The
documentation would include, for example, the complaint, the
name of the complainant, and the substance of the complaint or
the affidavit by the OPMC in support of the motion. 193
187 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(10)(o) (McKinney 1994); Levin v.
Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d 35, 38, 449 N.E.2d 730, 731, 462 N.Y.S.2d 836, 837 (1983). A
conventional physician's complaint of another physician's use of nonconventional
medicine will satisfy the Murawski guidelines. See supra notes 136-39 and
accompanying text.
188 See Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 40, 42, 449 N.E.2d at 732, 733-34, 462 N.Y.S.2d
at 838, 839-40; supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. Courts, however, should
question the reliability based upon the potential bias or hostility of conventional
physicians toward nonconventional physicians' medical care.
189 See Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 41-42, 449 N.E.2d at 733-34, 462 N.Y.S.2d at
839-40.
190 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §230(10)(o) (McKinney 1991); see, e.g., Tanner v.
Dr. A., 228 A.D.2d 238, 239, 644 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (1st Dep't 1996).
191 See, e.g., Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 38, 449 N.E.2d at 731, 462 N.Y.S.2d at
837; A'Hearn v. Comm. on Unlawful Practice of the Law of the N.Y. County
Lawyers' Ass'n, 23 N.Y.2d 916, 918, 246 N.E.2d 166, 167, 298 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316
(1969).
192 Shankman v. Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 203, 207, 535 N.E.2d 1323, 1324, 538
N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (1989).
193 See Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 42, 449 N.E.2d at 733-34, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 83940; Tanner, 228 A.D.2d at 239, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 21; Alter v. N.Y. State Bd. for Profl
Conduct, 145 Misc. 2d 393, 395-96, 546 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1989); Dombroff v. State Bd. For Profl. Med. Conduct, 131 Misc. 2d 472, 475, 500
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Therefore, the targeted physician would not know of, or be
allowed to examine, any of these documents and could, at best,
speculate about the basis of the investigation. 194 In these
circumstances, even the best advocates on behalf of the targeted
physician might be unable to persuade a court that the OPMC's
request for documents is unjustified or is not being made in good
faith.
It might, however, be reasonable to speculate that the
OPMC has not determined the effectiveness of the
nonconventional treatment. Therefore, it might be argued that
the investigation, and specifically the requests for a CMR or
documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum are not in good
faith. 195 The New York Court of Appeals, in Murawski, stated
that although the BPMC is required "to investigate each
complaint regardless of its source," that requirement is corollary
to the preliminary showing "that there be prima facie proof of a
justifiable basis for a good faith investigation of professional
misconduct."1 96 In the event that a supreme court justice orders
compliance, the targeted physician would be required to provide
the requested documents to the OPMC.
The physician's
noncompliance could result in a misconduct charge for the
failure to cooperate in the investigation. 197 This charge would
permit the suspension of the physician's medical license.
Because a BPMC investigation is permitted to extend
beyond the sum and substance of a single complaint, 198 records of
any and all patients, as well as records of any aspect of the
physician's practice, might be sought. 99 Although the initial
N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986).
194 Typically, in response to a complaint, the OPMC requests the records of a
particular patient. Based upon this request, the targeted physician has to speculate
regarding the basis of the investigation.
195 See Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 41-42; 449 N.E.2d at 733-34, 462 N.Y.S.2d at
839-40.
196 Id. at 41, 449 N.E.2d at 733, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
197See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530(15) (McKinney 1994) (stating that cooperation is
required); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(a)(2) (McKinney 1991). Due to Dr. Daniels'
unwillingness to permit an unfettered CMR, she was charged with a violation of
N.Y. Public Health Law section 230(10)(a)(4). The hearing committee and the ARB
suspended her license indefinitely.
198 See supra notes 103, 114-16 and accompanying text.
199 See, e.g., Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d at 38-39, 449 N.E.2d at 731, 462 N.Y.S.2d at
837-38. The BPMC requested any records, documents, and other writings related to
either specifically named patients or created within a particular time period. Id. at
38, 449 N.E.2d at 731, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 837; see also, Alter v. N.Y. State Dep't of
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complaint might be based upon a nonconventional treatment,
and the CMR based upon a single incident of alleged
incompetence, the ultimate charges and determination by the
hearing committee and ARB might be totally unrelated to the
20 0
physician's nonconventional medical practice.
While the legislature has recognized the important role that
licensed physicians play in the use of effective nonconventional
medical care in the practice of medicine, 20 1 the issue of the
effectiveness of nonconventional treatment is avoided by the
BPMC and the courts when they only address the physician's
failure to comply with conventional medical practices. The only
limitation actually imposed by the legislation upon the use of
nonconventional medicine is that it be effective. 20 2 In past cases,
however, both the BPMC and the New York courts have avoided
examinations of the effectiveness of particular nonconventional
treatments. 20 3 Rather,
courts
have indicated that a
Health, State Bd. for Profl Conduct, 145 Misc. 2d 393, 395-96, 546 N.Y.S.2d 746,
748 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989). In the case of a CMR, the review is broader than
the specific request for documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. See, e.g.,
Tanner v. Dr. A., 228 A.D.2d 238, 239, 644 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (1st Dep't 1996). An
actual notice of a CMR merely informs the targeted physician that the director of
the OPMC is ordering a comprehensive review of patient records. The physician is
further informed that the "[sitaff from the Office of Professional Medical Conduct
will select a number of [his or her] patient records and other such office records as
are related to the issue being reviewed." Attached to the letter notice is an order
signed by the chair of the BPMC for a comprehensive review of patient or office
records or both. The notice and order, dated June 22, 2000, were served upon Dr.
Daniels on or about June 29, 2000. Dr. Daniels indicates that she was informed that
the BPMC "wanted to see the records of the 4,000 patients who [had] seen [her] over
the prior 10 years." Open Letter from Dr. Daniels (on file with author). The order
was based upon a single incident of negligence or incompetence.
200 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 886-87,
648 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829-30 (3d Dep't 1996); Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. for Profl Med.
Conduct, 203 A.D.2d 617, 617-18, 610 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335-36 (3d Dep't 1994). In
Gonzalez, the physician was charged with, inter alia, failure to perform adequate
evaluations, failure to perform adequate physical examination, failure to obtain
adequate laboratory tests, and failure to maintain accurate records. By comparison,
it is interesting to note that the charges against Dr. Corsello were that she ordered
excessive tests and engaged in excessive treatments. See supra note 171-72 and
accompanying text.
201 See Holland Memo, supra note 86; Colman Memo, supra note 86.
202 Inherent in this limitation is patient injury or the substantial risk of injury.
When patient injury or a risk of injury exists, it is prima facie evidence of
ineffectiveness.
203 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 887-89, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830-31; Metzler,
203 A.D.2d at 618, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336; Atkins v. Guest, 158 Misc. 2d 426, 429-31,
601 N.Y.S.2d 234, 237-38 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993); see also Corsello Briefs and
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nonconventional treatment's effectiveness is irrelevant. 204
Thereby, physicians have been denied the opportunity to prove
effectiveness through expert witnesses, empirical data, and
patient testimonials.
Even when the testimony of a targeted nonconventional
physician's expert witness has been permitted, administrative
judges have inferentially discredited their testimony by
affirming the BPMC's finding of physician misconduct. 205
Further, appellate courts have consistently held that where
there is conflicting testimony between the experts for the BPMC
and the experts for the targeted physician, it is an issue of
credibility and weight to be resolved by the fact finder.20 6 Based
on the legislative requirement of effectiveness, however, greater
weight should be given to the targeted physician's
evidence-particularly expert testimony-that establishes that
nonconventional medical care is effective. 20 7
The expert testimony submitted by the BPMC has
historically contended that nonconventional treatment has not
Fact Sheet, supra note 171; Briefs of Dr. Daniels, supra note 174.
204 There are no reported cases where a treatment's effectiveness has been
raised in the medical disciplinary process. However, in Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d
987 (2d Cir. 1987), the issue of the effectiveness of the nonconventional treatment
was raised in the context of a malpractice action. The court held that the only issue
was "whether that treatment [was] a deviation from accepted medical practice in
the community." Id. at 990. Also, in Gonzalez, the physician attempted to introduce
evidence related to the treatment's effectiveness. The court held that the excluded
evidence at the disciplinary hearing by the administrative officer was harmless
error. Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 889, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
205 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 889, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 831.; Metzler, 203
A.D.2d at 618, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
206 See Schoenbach v. DeBuomo, 262 A.D.2d 820, 821-22, 692 N.Y.S.2d 208,
210-11, (3d Dep't 1999); Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d. at 889-90, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 831;
Minielly v. Comm'r of Health, 222 A.D.2d 750, 751, 634 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857 (3d Dep't
1995).
207 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d. at 889, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 831. The physician
claimed that the administrative officer erred in his evidentiary ruling by excluding
evidence of the effectiveness of the nonconventional treatment. The evidence
excluded the physician's "dissertation regarding the theory and protocol underlying
his practice" and "a paper containing case studies of patients of a []dentist ...each
of whom had undergone the same therapeutic protocol and who had successful
results." Id., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830. The court affirmed that the error in the
administrative officer's evidentiary ruling was harmless because the physician's
expert witnesses testified regarding the same issues. It is interesting to note that
the court acknowledged that the physician's experts were "highly respected in their
respective fields." Id., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 831. Despite their reputation and their
testimony in support of the effectiveness of the nonconventional treatment, the
physician's license was revoked based upon negligence and incompetence.
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been accepted within the mainstream medical community. The
BPMC maintains this position even when the nonconventional
medicine at issue is widely used in other states and foreign
countries. 20 8 The legislature has envisioned precisely these
circumstances and has provided safeguards in the peer review
disciplinary process. "[N]o legitimate peer review exists when
issues involve clinical practice that is foreign, innovative, or has
been shown to be effective, but has not yet achieved general
20 9
acceptance in the United States."
At what point in the disciplinary process can evidence of
effectiveness be presented?
Physicians are denied the
opportunity to provide effective, nonconventional medical care
because the BPMC is not required to prove ineffectiveness as
early as possible in the disciplinary process. Additionally, the
hearing officer is not required to give greater weight to or even
admit the physician's evidence of effectiveness. Furthermore,
patients do not have the freedom to choose their medical
treatments. 210 Rather than applying the standard evidentiary
rule, that the weight to be given to conflicting expert testimony
is solely within the province of the fact finder,2 11 the appellate
court should apply a rule that acknowledges a respectable
minority or "error of judgment." 212
208 For example, "[in Germany, homeopathy is a required discipline for all
medical students and is used by twenty percent of all German physicians. In
France, approximately forty percent of physicians use homeopathic remedies, and in
India there are over one hundred thousand homeopathic physicians and onehundred twenty homeopathic medical schools." In England, an act of Parliament
has recognized homeopathy as a post-graduate medical specialty. "Over forty
percent of British physicians either use homeopathic remedies or refer patients to
homeopathic physicians.... [H]omeopathic hospitals and outpatient facilities are
part of the British national health care system." LARRY TRIVIERI, THE AMERICAN
HOLISTIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO HOLISTIC HEALTH 274 (John Wiley &

Sons 2001). In contrast, the BPMC and the court in Metzler noted that homeopathy

is not recognized in New York. Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. for Profl Med. Conduct,
203 A.D.2d 617, 618, 610 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335 (3d Dep't 1994).
209 Colman Memo, supra note 86, at 381.
210 See Holland Memo, supra note 86 (citing the Court of Appeals decision in
Schloendorffv. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), to support the

claim that patients have the right to make nonconforming medical decisions);
Colman Memo, supra note 86 (citing Atkins for the same claim).
211 See, e.g., Schoenbach, 262 A.D.2d at 821, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 210-11; Gonzalez,
232 A.D.2d at 889-90, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 831; Minielly, 222 A.D.2d at 751, 634

N.Y.S.2d at 857.
212 See Glen E. Bradford, The "Respectable Minority" Doctrine in Missouri
Medical Negligence Law, 56 J. Mo. BAR 326, 327 (2000) (suggesting that that courts
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Courts should reinforce a physician's right to submit any
relevant evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of medical
treatments that differ from the acceptable and prevailing
medical practice. 213 The BPMC and the courts must consider
whether a physician exercised his or her best judgment by using
"the skill and learning of the average physician, to exercise
reasonable care and to exert [his or her] best judgment in the
effort to bring about a good result."214 An evidentiary rule that
provides due weight to a nonconventional physician's expert
witnesses would foster accurate assessments of whether a
physician used his or her best judgment to offer effective
nonconventional health care.
The enactment of the AMPA 215 gives physicians the right to
use effective nonconventional medical care and gives patients
the right to choose innovative medical care. To ensure the
safeguards intended by AMPA, courts should require the
following:
(1) complaints based upon the use of nonconventional medical
care be evaluated at the investigation stage to determine the
effectiveness of that care;
(2) the failure of the BMPC, hearing committee, or the ARB to
determine the ineffectiveness of the innovative medical care is
prima facie evidence of the lack of good faith necessary to
proceed with an investigation;
(3) ultimate charges and final determination of the hearing
committee must be based on the substance of the initial
complaint rather than exclusively upon any subsequent
discovery of a physician's failure to conform to acceptable
216
conventional medical standards;
should adopt either a reasonableness or a reasonable minority standard in their
review of medical board decisions to suspend or revoke a physician's license); see
also Barbara D. Goldberg, As Alternative Treatments Increase, So May Malpractice
Claims, 16(7) MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY 1, 2 n.36 (1999); Glenn E.
Bradford & David G. Meyers, The Legal and Regulatory Climate in the State of
Missouri for Complementary and Alternative Medicine - Honest Disagreement
Among Competent Physicians Or Medical McCarthyism?, 70 UMKC L. REV. 55, 6567 (2001); see also infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
213 Evidence might include expert testimony from non-physician practitioners,
such as homeopaths or acupuncturist, nonconventional medical journals and
studies, and reports of successful results from patients.
214 Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898).
215 See supranotes 84-90 and accompanying text.
216 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §230(10)(a)(iv) (McKinney 1991) (authorizing a
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(5) the administrative hearing officer must receive evidence on
the nonconventional treatment's effectiveness.

Finally, the courts should consider each of the following to
be evidence of bias:
(1) the original complainant is a conventional physician or the
BPMC; or
(2) there is no preliminary determination of ineffectiveness; or
(3) nonconventional physician members of the BPMC do not
constructively participate on either the investigative hearing
committees; or
(4) when nonconventional experts are not consulted on issues of
217
clinical practice.

These recommendations would diminish the vulnerability of
CAM physicians like Drs. Corsello and Daniels, to complaints by
other physicians and to investigations which may result in the
suspension or revocation of their medical licenses simply because
their practices deviated from the prevailing and acceptable
medical practice.
B.

UnprofessionalConduct Standard

Since 1914, patients have had the right to determine what is
done to their own bodies. 218 Currently, it is clear that patients
have the right "to make an informed decision to go outside
currently approved medical methods in search of an
comprehensive medical review board upon a single incident of negligence). However,
physicians who practice innovative medicine are particularly vulnerable to
complaints of negligence or incompetence or both because their practice by
definition does not conform to accepted medical practices. This vulnerability leads to
the appearance of persecution to these physicians when (1) their practices have not
been determined to be ineffective, (2) there has not been any patient harm or
complaint by a patient, and (3) the eventual charges are based upon inadequate or
excessive testing, inadequate monitoring, and record keeping.
217 Physicians should not otherwise be required to prove bias by individual
members of the hearing committee or ARB. See, e.g., Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. for
Profi Med. Conduct, 203 A.D.2d 617, 619, 610 N.Y.S.3d 334, 336 (3d Dep't 1994); see
also supra text accompanying notes 152-162.
218 See Mrachek v. Sunshone Biscuit, Inc. 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E.2d 801(1954);
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-130, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)
(Cardozo, J.) (applying the rule of respondeat superior and abandoning reliance on
whether the act producing the injury was medical or administrative), overruled on
othergrounds by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
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unconventional treatment."219 Moreover, an express assumption
of risk by patients is an affirmative defense that totally bars a
recovery in a malpractice claim. 220 Therefore, when such an
express assumption occurs, physicians are permitted to deviate
from the duty to treat patients according to the prevailing and
accepted medical community's standards. 221 However, although
a physician's liability may be diminished in a malpractice claim
due to patients' consent to assume the risk associated with
nonconventional treatments, the physician may still be subject to
license revocation in a medical disciplinary action because that
same conduct deviated from the medical community's
222
standards.
"[Pirofessional licensing discipline cases frequently turn on
standard of care issues."2 23 Most states have enacted legislation
requiring medical boards to investigate all complaints
received. 224 This legislation, however, has often failed to provide
guidelines for medical boards to determine which complaints
merit proceeding to a hearing.225 Other statutes have provided
medical boards with too much discretion by allowing an
investigation and sanction of physicians for any departure from
prevailing medical practices. 226 The medical boards and the
courts in Metzler, Gonzalez, and In re Guess applied the standard
that a physician's conduct must conform to acceptable medical
practices. 227 This standard of care is essentially the equivalent

Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1987).
See id. (explaining that while assumption of risk was a bar to recovery prior
to 1975, now contributory negligence merely diminishes recovery).
221 See Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1992).
222 See, e.g., Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 618; 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
223 Bradford, supranote 212; Bradford & Meyers, supra note 212, at 58.
219
220

224 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230(10)(i) (McKinney 1996) ("The board
for professional medical conduct... shall investigate each complaint received
regardless of the source.").
225 See id. § 230(10)(a)(iv) ("If the director of the office of professional medical
conduct, after obtaining the concurrence of a majority of an investigation committee,
and after consultation with the executive secretary, determines that a hearing is

warranted the director shall ...direct counsel to prepare the charges.").
226 See In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 834-36 (N.C. 1990) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-14(a)(6) (1985)); see also Cohen, supra note 23, at 88, 150.

227 The standard may be statutorily defined as in In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d at
835-36. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. On the other hand, it may
be judicially defined as in Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 618-19, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336. See
supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text; see also Cohen, note 23, at 121-22.
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of the standard applied by the courts in medical malpractice
22
cases. 8
An important difference in professional misconduct
complaints filed against nonconventional physicians, however,
"is that it is generally not required that the state medical board
establish that the questioned medical care caused injury."229 For
that matter, most medical boards are not even required to prove
230
a risk of patient injury.
For a physician to be found negligent in a medical
disciplinary proceeding, New York courts have consistently held
that patient injury231 or even a "foreseeable risk of injury to a
specific patient" is unnecessary. 232 The Bogdan and Morfesis
courts, like the Metzler and Gonzalez courts, found that the
applicable standard was whether "a physician failed to exercise
the care that a reasonably prudent physician would exercise
under the circumstances." 233 Unlike Metzler and Gonzalez, the
physicians in Bogdan and Morfesis were conventional
practitioners.
This is significant because the standard for
conventional practitioners must be that of the "reasonably
prudent physician." There is no other reasonable standard by
which to evaluate their conduct. Also, the Bogdan and Morfesis
cases were decided prior to the enactment of the AMPA of
1994.234 While the Metzler and Gonzalez cases were decided by
the Appellate Division, Third Department, after the enactment
228 See Bradford & Meyers, supra note 212, at 56-57; see also Nestorowich v.
Ricotta, 97 N.Y.2d 393, 398, 767 N.E.2d 125, 128, 740 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (2002)
(discussing malpractice standard in New York).
229 Bradford & Meyers, supra note 212, at 58 n.26 (citing Swope v. Printz, 468
S.W.2d 34, 39 (Mo. 1971)).
230 See In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d at 838; see also Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 889-90, 648 N.Y.S.2d 827, 831 (3d Dep't 1996). To the
extent that medical boards aggressively pursue physicians who integrate CAM into
their medical practices "without a showing of patient injury ignore that there are at
least three competing interests at stake (the profession's, the individual physician's
and the public's)." Cohen, supra note 23, at 150.
231 See Morfesis v. Sobol, 172 A.D.2d 897, 898-99, 567 N.Y.S.2d 954, 956 (3d
Dep't 1991).
232 See Bogdan v. N.Y. Bd. for Prof'l Med. Conduct, 195 A.D.2d 86, 89, 606
N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (3d Dep't 1993).
233 Id. at 88, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 382. The court in Morfesis held that the
physician's conduct must not deviate from accepted standards. Morfesis, 172 A.D.2d
at 898-99, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
234 The New York Act of 1994, Ch. 558, §§ 1, 2, 1994 N.Y. Laws, amended one
section of the New York Education Law § 6527(4)(e) and two sections of the New
York Public Health Law, §§ 230(1), 230(10)(a)(ii).
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of AMPA, neither case raised the issue of patient injury or the
235
risk of patient injury.
Nevertheless, in Gonzalez, the appellate division cited to
Bogdan for the proposition that the applicable standard for
medical disciplinary cases is that the physician must "exercise
the care that a reasonably prudent physician would exercise
under the circumstances." 236
Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that the court would reject the argument that either
patient harm or the risk of patient harm is a prerequisite to a
finding of misconduct, particularly negligence or incompetence,
in medical disciplinary proceeding against nonconventional
physicians.
Like the North Carolina statute in In re Guess,237 the New
York statutory scheme "is directed to protecting the health and
safety of patients and the public." 238
Furthermore, "[tlhe
common thread running through each of [the] reasons for
revocation of a license is the threat or potential for harm to
patients and the public." 239 "The public policy at the root of the
bill [Public Health Law section 230] was to prevent a physician
from causing, engaging in or maintaining a condition or activity
which constitutes an imminent danger to the health of the
people." 240 Absent proof of patient injury, or the risk thereof, or
proof of the treatment's ineffectiveness, physicians who use
innovative medical care do not constitute "an imminent danger.
2 41
to the health of the people."

235 The Gonzalez decision was subsequent to the enactment of AMPA. The
physician's hearing and the hearing committee's decision were prior to the passing
of AMPA. The court concluded that "in the absence of any indication of legislative
intent to provide retroactivity... the legislation should only be applied
prospectively." Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 888; 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830 (citations omitted).
The court in Morfesis affirmed the administrative decision that the physician's
conduct deviated from accepted standards. Morfesis, 172 A.D.2d at 897, 567
N.Y.S.2d at 956.
236 Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 889, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
237 See In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 835-36 (N.C. 1990).
238 Id. at 840 (Frye, J., dissenting); see also Memorandum of Assemb. Hevesi,
reprinted in 1977 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 773.
239 In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d at 840-41 (Frye, J., dissenting).
240 Atkins v. Guest, 158 Misc. 2d 426, 431, 601 N.Y.S.2d 234, 238 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1993) (citing Memorandum of Assemb. Hevesi, reprinted in 1977 N.Y. ST.
LEGIS. ANN. 773).

241

Id., 601 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
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The reported facts in Metzler and Gonzalez, however, do not
indicate that a patient was injured. 242 The charges against both
physicians included gross negligence, negligence on more than
one occasion, and failure to maintain records. 243 In both cases,
the facts upon which the physicians were charged, found guilty,
and had their license suspended or revoked essentially stemmed
from their failure to perform conventional physical
examinations, appropriate assessments, conduct adequate
laboratory tests or diagnostic studies, and provide sufficient
follow-up or monitoring. 244 Unlike In re Guess, where the
physician was charged with practicing homeopathy, 245 the
physicians in Gonzalez and Metzler were in essence charged with
not practicing conventional medicine. This conclusion runs
against the goals of the AMPA.
The AMPA was enacted to protect nonconventional
physicians from being charged with and sanctioned for the
practice of effective nonconventional medicine. Therefore, there
must be proof either that the nonconventional therapy is
ineffective, that it poses a greater risk of patient injury than
conventional medicine, or that it in fact caused injury rather
than a mere designation of being nonconventional in order for
charges of the failure to practice conventional medicine to be
affirmed by the courts.
Reminiscent of the philosophical battles between the AMA
246
and homeopathic physicians in the early twentieth century,
242 See supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text. In Metzler, "[tihe Committee
unanimously concluded that the petitioner's treatment of one of his patients, who

died from pneumocystic pneumonia and was suffering from AIDS, did not meet the
minimum standards of acceptable medical practice and was so egregious as to

constitute gross negligence." Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. for Profl Med. Conduct, 203
A.D.2d 617, 618, 610 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335 (3d Dep't 1994). The court, and perhaps the

hearing committee, did not specify how the physician's conduct failed to meet the
minimum standards. See generally id., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
243

In addition, Dr. Gonzalez was charged with gross incompetence and with

gross incompetence on more than one occasion. Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of

Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 886, 648 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829 (3d Dep't 1996).
244 See id., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 829; Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 618, 610 N.Y.S.2d at

336.
245

See In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 834-35 (N.C. 1990). "[Tlhe [bloard charged

Dr. Guess with unprofessional conduct.., specifically based upon his practice of
homeopathy.... The [bloard further alleged that the use of homeopathic medicines

'departs from and does not conform to the standards of acceptable and prevailing
medical practice in the State of North Carolina.' "Id. at 834-35.
246 See generally supra note 11. Some would argue that the battle was more
economic than philosophical. See Andrews, supra note 9, at 1288-89; Boozang,
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however, the Metzler hearing committee, ARB, and the court
expressly noted, that "homeopathy is not recognized in New York
State as a separate branch of medicine nor is petitioner
separately licensed as a homeopathic physician."247 By recasting
the charges from practicing homeopathy to not practicing
conventional medicine consistent with the acceptable and
prevailing medical practice, the statutory authority that permits
physicians to use effective nonconventional medical care is
undermined. 248 Suspension or revocation of nonconventional
physicians' licenses for the failure to maintain the standards of
conventional physicians is particularly egregious where there is
no evidence of patient harm; the alleged violations are related to
conventional medical practices, such as laboratory and
diagnostic testing, follow-up evaluations and monitoring, and
maintaining accurate records; and when the patients fully and
249
adequately consented to the nonconventional treatment.
It is axiomatic that there are significant differences in the
philosophical underpinnings and practices between conventional
and nonconventional health care. 250 Due to these differences,
nonconventional medical practices such as homeopathy and
acupuncture involve different diagnostic procedures
or
evaluations than conventional medicine. 251 Based upon the
supra note 1, at 186.
247 Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 618, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335. The hearing committee,
administrative review board, and the court "noted that there are no different
standards for licensed physicians based upon their philosophy." Id. at 619, 610
N.Y.S.2d at 336. The court also held that neither the hearing committee nor the
review board are required to have a member who practices nonconventional
medicine, much less one of the same philosophy of the reviewed physician. Id., 610
N.Y.S.2d at 336; see supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text (discussing
disciplinary procedures and committee members).
248 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(4)(e) (McKinney 1994); see supra note 184.
249 See Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 888, 648
N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (3d Dep't 1996); Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 617-18, 610 N.Y.S.2d at
336. In both cases, the court held that "it is well settled that a patient's consent to or
even insistence upon a certain treatment does not relieve a physician from the
obligation of treating the patient with the usual standard of care." Gonzalez, 232
A.D.2d at 888, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830 (quoting Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 619, 610
N.Y.S.2d at 336).
250 See Andrews, supra note 9, at 1288-89 (discussing philosophical difference
between conventional and nonconventional medicine); Boozang, supra note 1, at
186; see also Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 617-18, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36 (recognizing
different branches in philosophy of medicine). See generally, Cohen, supra note 23,
at 139.
251 For example, the typical diagnostic procedure for acupuncture includes four
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initial evaluations, the homeopathic physician or the physician
who practices acupuncture will develop treatment plans
accordingly. 252 When physicians offer nonconventional medical
care, they are, by definition, departing from "conventionally
accepted medical standards." 253 Therefore, the assessment of the
standard of care for nonconventional physicians should be
measured by whether it deviates from the degree of knowledge
and skill possessed or the degree of care ordinarily exercised by
similarly practicing health care providers under similar
circumstances. 254 Accordingly, homeopathic physicians' conduct
should be evaluated by the accepted homeopathic standard of
care. 255 When there is not' a recognized "school" for the
nonconventional medical care, a "general reasonableness
standard" should be applied.25 6
basic techniques: observation, palpitation, interviewing, and listening. The
practitioner observes the condition of the patient's face, hair, skin, and nails, and
also observes how the patient stands and walks. The practitioner palpitates
pressure points and takes twelve pulse readings, six on each wrist. The practitioner
interviews the patient to elicit data that facilitates an assessment of the primary
elemental energy imbalance of the five energies: wood, fire, earth, metal, and water.
The practitioner also listens to the patient's voice to clarify the primary energy
imbalance. See Acupuncture, at http://www.healthhelper. com complementary/
alternative/acupuncture.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003); Acupuncturist Diagnosis,
at http://www.aworldofacupuncture.com/acupuncture-diagnosis.htm;
see also
TRIVIERI, supra note 208, at 353-56; Cohen, supra note 23, at 109.
252 See supra note 251.
253 See Cohen, supranote 23, at 109.
254 See Cohen & Eisenberg, supra note 20 (explaining that "alternative schools
of medicine" also apply the "reasonable practitioner standard" so that the "osteopath
is held to the 'reasonable practitioner' standard, that is, an osteopath is held to the
'reasonable osteopath' standard and a naturopath is held to the 'reasonable
naturopath' standard."); Doyle, supra note 6, at 549. CAM-practicing physicians will
likely be held to a higher standard because of "a general reluctance to place even
established alternative schools on a level with conventional medicine when
determining standard of care." Cohen & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 549; see also
Goldberg, supra note 212. The public policy concerns of legislation intended to
protect nonconventional physicians, such as NY AMPA, "support the use of a
general 'reasonableness' standard of care, rather than the narrower 'accepted
practice' standard, where the alternative practitioner does not belong to any
particular 'school' that could define accepted practice." Id. Some advocate the use of
the reasonableness standard in the context of medical malpractice strategies to be
used on behalf of CAM physicians. Id. The standard, however, is equally applicable,
if not more so, in the context of disciplinary action because the AMPA was primarily
intended to protect CAM physicians charged with misconduct. See supra notes 8590 and accompanying text.
255 See, e.g., THE SOCIETY OF HOMEOPATHS, CODE OF ETHICS AND PRACTICE

(2001); see also Boozang, supranote 1, at 207; COHEN, supra note 17, at 64-66.
256 Goldberg, supra note 212, at 4 (indicating that the use of a reasonableness
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Currently, the New York courts require all nonconventional
physicians to practice conventional medicine. 257 The courts are
interpreting the legislative intent that allows physicians to use
medical care to mean that
effective nonconventional
nonconventional physicians must comply with the accepted and
prevailing medical practice. No consideration has been given to
whether the standard of care for the nonconventional treatment
was met or, more importantly, whether the nonconventional
treatment was effective. 258 Furthermore, consideration is not
given to whether physicians use nonconventional medical care
exclusively or if they have also assumed responsibility for
All
physicians,
including
patients'
primary
care.
nonconventional physicians, who assume responsibility for
patients' primary care should be required to conform to the
accepted and prevailing medical practice. For example, Dr.
Metzler, who exclusively practiced homeopathy, informed his
patients that "he approaches 'health care as a primary care
practitioner who can treat all [their] ailments. If additional care
is needed, such as surgery, then [he] desire[s] to be contacted
Under
first so [he] can coordinate the additional care.' "259
circumstances such as these, the ARB and the court should apply
260
"the minimum standards of acceptable medical practice."
Nonconventional primary care physicians are not entitled to the
application of standards that differ from conventional primary
Patients are entitled to rely upon their
care physicians.
expectation gained from experience with primary care physicians
that conventional medical practices will be used. Physicians who
exclusively use nonconventional medical care and obtain patient

standard in medical malpractice cases in which there are no recognized or accepted
schools within which some of the unique nonconventional medical treatments may
belong).
257 See Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 888, 648
N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (3d Dep't 1996); Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. of Profl Conduct, 203
A.D.2d 617, 619, 610 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (3d Dep't 1994).
258 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(4)(e), supra note 185. The Gonzalez court noted
that both the hearing committee and the administrative review board "recognized
that alternative medicine involves a different treatment regime ... [w]ithout
questioning the merits of [the physician's] therapeutic protocol." The court stated
that the basic medical standards "do not vary based on the treatment regime."
Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 888, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
259 Metzler, 203 A.D.2d at 618, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
260 Id., 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
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consent, however, should be held to the standard of care defined
261
by the nonconventional practice.
As part of patients' informed consent to nonconventional
medical care, 262 physicians should include an explicit notice to
patients stating that they are not primary care physicians.
Further, patients should be advised to continue consulting with
or begin to consult a primary care physician. With proper
consent and patient advice, physicians who choose to practice
nonconventional medicine should be charged with medical
misconduct only when the BPMC proves that the practice was
ineffective, that there was patient harm or risk thereof, 263 or that
the physician deviated from the nonconventional practice
264
standard.
C. Legislative Reform

The legislative intent of the AMPA of 1994 was to permit
physicians to use effective nonconventional medical care 265 in
order to assure that those "charged with misconduct [would]
receive "fair consideration by those best qualified to judge his or
her practice and methods of treatment" and to enhance the
quality of care "through the constructive participation of
nonconventional physicians in the disciplinary process." 266 This
intention has been undermined by the BPMC. The BPMC,
through the OPMC, has not recognized a nonconventional
medical practitioner's right to peer review by a disciplinary
process that includes at least one nonconventional physician at
any stage. Indeed, the BPMC has selected conventional medical
experts pursuant to Public Health Law section 230(10)(1)(ii) in a
case in which a nonconventional physician's alleged misconduct
charges involved her clinical practice. 267 In that instance, the
conventional medical expert admitted that
261 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 888, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830; Metzler, 203
A.D.2d at 619, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336; see also supra notes 248-53 and accompanying

text.
263

See supra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 224-36 and accompanying text.

264

See supra notes 212-41 and accompanying text.

265

See supra note 183.
Holland Memo, supra note 86; Colman Memo, supra note 86.

262

266

267 See Corsello Briefs and Fact Sheet, supra note 171. The choice of
conventional medical experts to review the clinical practice of physicians who
practice innovative medicine is inconsistent with the spirit of AMPA and legislative

intent. Id.; see also Holland Memo, supra note 86; Colman Memo, supra note 86.
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[m] any of the modalities used by Dr. Corsello are foreign to me.
It would take a massive amount of research to establish them
as non-efficacious and possibly harmful. Mr. Fischer has
informed me that the burden of proof is upon Dr. Corsello to
defend them as safe and efficacious .... In a book on
alternative medicine just published by the AMA, I found no
268
reference to the methods in her practice.
Requests by Dr. Corsello that the BPMC consult an expert
familiar with nonconventional medical care were denied. 269 The
BPMC has also taken the position that nonconventional
physicians are not required to participate on the investigation or
270
hearing committees, or on the ARB.
The appellate courts have not reviewed the question of
whether nonconventional medical experts must be consulted
when complaints involve the clinical practice of nonconventional
physicians. The amendment to Public Health Law section
230(10)(o)(ii), however, specifically provided that, when there are
issues involving the clinical practices of nonconventional
physicians, experts may be made available "by New York State
268 Letter from Arthur Tomases, M.D. to Mr. Sheehan of the OPMC (Mar. 2,
2002) (on file with author). Despite Dr. Tomases admitted unfamiliarity with CAM
and his inability to thoroughly research the medical care provided by Dr. Corsello,
he did submit a report. The report is currently unavailable. Dr. Corsello was
charged with excessive testing and treatment even though the expert, and therefore
the OPMC, had no appreciation of the nature of Dr. Corsello's clinical practice.
269 See Letter from Roy Nemerson, Deputy Counsel, Bureau of Professional
Medical Conduct, to Wilfred T. Friedman, Esq., Attorney to Dr. Corsello (Aug. 14,
2002) (on file with author). In the letter, Mr. Nemerson wrote:
Your letter is incorrectly premised on an assumption that Dr. Corsello has
the right to choose the medical expert the Department consults. Please be
advised that the Department chooses its expert based upon their
qualifications to testify with regard to the standard of practice to which
physicians are held. She holds herself out as a physician. She practices the
profession of medicine. The Department will present appropriate expert
testimony regarding minimally acceptable standards for the practice of
medicine as relevant to the facts of the case. I will be signing the charges
in the matter based on the expert review already obtained.
Id.; Letter from Terrence J. Sheehan, Esq., Associate Counsel, Bureau of
Professional Medical Conduct, to Wilfred T. Friedman, Esq. (Aug. 22, 2000) (on file
with author) (wherein Mr. Sheehan stated, "[iln reply to your letter dated July 16,
2000, please be advised that this office denies your request to have this case
reviewed by a different medical reviewer"); Letter from Roy Nemerson, Deputy
Counsel, Bureau of Professional Conduct to Wilfred T. Friedman, Esq. (Sept. 5,
2000) (on file with author) (reaffirming an earlier decision to deny the physician's
request for an expert who would be better qualified to judge her practice and
treatments).
270 See Letter from Roy Nemerson to Wilfred Friedman, supra note 269.
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medical associations dedicated to the advancement of
nonconventional treatments."271 In cases such as Dr. Corsello's,
nonconventional physician experts should be consulted to review
the targeted physician's clinical practice.
The appellate courts have denied physicians' claims that a
nonconventional physician member of BPMC must participate on
either the hearing committee or the ARB.27 2 Nonconventional
physicians' "guarantee [of] legitimate due process" has been
effectively denied by the combination of the BPMC's policy to
refuse to consult nonconventional physician experts and with
court decisions that Public Health Law section 230 does not
require participation by nonconventional physicians in the
273
disciplinary process.
Physicians who have been charged with and investigated for
the use of nonconventional health care have not had their choice
Instead, these
of treatment reviewed for its effectiveness.
physicians have been investigated for and charged with the
failure to conform with conventional medical practices.27 4 The
of
of physicians for the use
OPMC's investigation
nonconventional medical care has been a pretense to uncover
275
any shortcomings in the practice of nonconventional medicine.
"[B]efore the investigative engines of governmental agencies
are started up against" 276 physicians who practice innovative
medicine, the pre-investigative good faith requirement must
include an assessment of the effectiveness of the medical care.
See Holland Memo, supra note 86.
See Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 232 A.D.2d 886, 888, 648
N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (3d Dep't 1996); Metzler v. N.Y. State Bd. of Profl Med. Conduct,
203 A.D.2d 617, 619, 610 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (3d Dep't 1994).
273 See Holland Memo, supra note 86; Colman Memo, supra note 86.
274 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d at 888, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 830; Metzler, 203
A.D.2d at 619, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 336; Atkins v. Guest, 158 Misc. 2d 426, 427-28, 601
N.Y.S.2d 234, 235-36 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993); Corsello Briefs and Fact Sheet,
supra note 171, at 3; Briefs of Dr. Daniels, supra note 174.
275 Although each of the physicians were initially investigated because of their
innovative medical practice, they were most frequently charged with inadequate
record keeping, inadequate testing, follow-ups, monitoring, and excessive testing.
See, e.g., Gonzalez, 232 A.D.2d. at 886-87, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 829; Metzler, 203 A.D.2d
at 617-19, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36; supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text. To
date, none of the physicians were found guilty of the practice of ineffective
nonconventional medical care. It is inconceivable that the complaints against these
physicians were based upon inadequate record keeping and testing.
276 Levin v. Murawski, 59 N.Y.2d 35, 41, 449 N.E.2d 730, 733, 462 N.Y.S.2d
836, 839 (1983).
271
272
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Furthermore, the BPMC should be required to charge and prove
ineffectiveness of the medical care at the disciplinary hearing. A
focus on the treatment's effectiveness also shifts the standard of
care from acceptable and prevailing medical practice to the
2 77
particular nonconventional standard of care.
The OPMC's methods have had "an indisputable chilling
effect on the practice of nonconventional therapies by licensed
physicians." 278 Physicians have become acutely aware of the risk
posed to their licenses and reputations by the use of innovative
therapies.2 7 9 The New York State Legislature needs to provide
more specific guidelines for the BPMC and the courts in order to
ensure legitimate due process for physicians who practice
innovative medical care and to protect the freedom of patients to
28 0
choose their own medical treatments.
Based on the foregoing, legislative reform is necessary and
28 1
should include the following measures:
(1) The OPMC should be required to consult medical experts
dedicated to the advancement of nonconventional medical
treatment when a complaint against a CAM physician involves
issues of clinical practice;

277
278

279

See supra notes 250-256 and accompanying text.
Colman Memo, supra note 86 (supporting the AMPA).
See generally Burton Goldberg, supra note 84; COHEN, supra note 166. In

January 2002, Monica Miller, on behalf of the Foundation for the Advancement of
Innovative Medicine, testified before the NYS Legislator on the disciplinary process
for physicians. Monica Miller, Testimony On the DisciplinaryProcess for Physicians
and
Physician
Assistants,
available
at
www.healthlobby.com/OPMC%20testimony.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2002). She
was asked the question whether there are "classes of physicians ... that are
uniquely targeting for investigation." Id. Her response was that "the classes
include[d] but are not limited to: [pihysicians diagnosing and treating chronic Lyme
disease, doctors affiliated with complementary and alternative medicine, foreign
graduates, and persons with Hispanic or Middle-Eastern names." Id.
280 See generally Colman Memo, supra note 86; Holland Memo, supra note 86.
281 Currently pending before
the New York State Legislature is
S.7466/A.11330b that seeks "to make the process more reasonable, less secretive
and provides redress for the availability of new evidence and disputes about rulings.
It strengthens the essential elements of due process: notice and an opportunity to be
heard." Final Draft of the Commentary and Recommendation 2 (Sept. 27, 2002) (on
file with author). The Health Law Section of the New York State Bar Association
has submitted "Commentary and Recommendations," regarding policies and
procedures of the OPMC. Id. Their submission addresses such issues as the
interview process, discovery, specificity of charges, and consideration of a statute of
limitation. Id. These observations and recommendations do not specifically address
the unique concerns of physicians who practice CAM. Id.
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(2) The OPMC should foster constructive participation by a
nonconventional physician by an appointment to the
investigative or hearing committee or both;
(3) The OPMC should be required to demonstrate a prima facie
case that the nonconventional medical treatment is ineffective
before conducting a CMR or issuing a subpoena duces tecum;
(4) Physicians should be permitted to submit evidence of the
effectiveness and acceptance of the innovative medical care
from other communities including CAM journals. 28 2 The lack of
acceptableness by the general conventional community should
not be considered evidence of ineffectiveness. The OPMC
should be required to submit evidence in the nature of studies
or reports that support the conclusion of ineffectiveness. The
OPMC should have the burden of proving ineffectiveness or
patient harm;
(5) Physicians who exclusively practice innovative medical care
and have not assumed primary care responsibility for patients
should have their standard of care determined by the
reasonableness of their judgment. 28 3 These physicians should
not be subject to misconduct charges for failure to practice
conventional medicine (e.g. diagnostic testing, adequate followups and record keeping). They should, however, be required to
obtain informed consent that includes advice to the patient to
28 4
seek a primary care physician.
As an alternative to suggestion five, legislation might be
enacted that clearly advises physicians of their obligation to
maintain aspects of their conventional practice. 28 5 For example,
the states of Louisiana, 286 Nevada, 28 7 and Texas 288 have enacted
282 See Day v. Aetna-Employees Ben. Div., 1989 WL 69718 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
(stating that the trial judge accorded greater weight to an article submitted by
plaintiff from the Journal of Holistic Medicine).
283 See Sherman v. Bd. of Regents, 24 A.D.2d 315, 318, 266 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43 (3d
Dep't 1966), affd 19 N.Y.2d 679, 225 N.E.2d 560, 278 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1967); Gieleskie

v. New York, 10 A.D.2d 471, 474, 200 N.Y.S.2d 691, 694 (3d Dep't 1960), affd, 9
N.Y.2d 834, 175 N.E.2d 455, 216 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1961); see also supra notes 210-12
and accompanying text.
284 See Corsello Briefs and Fact Sheet, supra note 171, at 1. Dr. Serafma

Corsello, as part of her integrative medical practice, maintains an office policy that
requires patients to have a conventional provider as a primary care physician. Id.
285 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing general due
process right to notice).
286 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285.3 (West 1999).
287 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.3062 (Michie 2000).
288 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 200.1-200.3 (West 1998).

2003]

COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE

121

legislation which provides that physicians must conduct a full
evaluation of the patient, including conventional methods of
diagnosis, such as addressing relevant medical history and
conducting an appropriate physical examination, offering a
medical diagnosis and patient treatment plan, and obtaining
informed consent, prior to offering any nonconventional medical
therapy. The legislation should also clearly inform physicians of
the extent to which they are obligated to maintain adequate
conventional records, monitoring, and follow-up evaluations.
CONCLUSION

The New York State Legislature enacted the AMPA of 1994
with the intent to protect "the rights of nonconventional
physicians throughout the misconduct process" and to secure
"the rights and freedom of patients to choose their own medical
treatments."2 9 However, the policy and practices of the BPMC,
particularly through the OPMC, and judicial construction have
severely restricted the intended impact of the legislation. These
practices and court decisions have indeed had a chilling effect on
physicians who might consider integrating innovative medical
care into their practices. Physicians who currently use any
innovative medical care in their practices have been particularly
vulnerable to charges of professional misconduct. Physicians
who have been investigated and charged with misconduct by the
OPMC have faced financial devastation, loss of reputation, and
the eventual revocation of their medical licenses.
Tens of
thousands of patients have simultaneously lost their choice of
medical treatment and physician. In addition, because of the
limited availability of physicians who practice innovative
medicine and the chilling effect of the risks associated with the
practice of nonconventional medicine by others who may
consider it, these patients will be severely limited in their future
choice of medical treatment.
As the two published studies in the New England Journal of
Medicine and the Journal of American Medical Association have
indicated, more people have been consulting CAM providers than
conventional physicians. It is expected that consumer spending
in this area will grow by as much as thirty percent. Some
physicians and consumers consider the reason for the current
289 Holland Memo, supra note 86; Colman Memo, supra note 86.
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practices of the OPMC to be the same reason for the policies and
practices of the AMA throughout most of the twentieth centuryeconomics.
With the goal of reassuring the "safeguard [ofl patient's
rights and [the] guarantee [of] legitimate due process for
nonconventional physicians" 290 have come certain proposals for
reform. On a judicial level, reform would require the expansion
of the pre-investigative stage of a complaint. To meet the good
faith requirement, the OPMC should hire nonconventional
medical experts to evaluate the effectiveness of the innovative
medical treatment. In order to satisfy the legislative intent to
provide "constructive participation" by the nonconventional
physicians appointed to the BPMC, courts should require their
appointment to investigative or hearing committees. Finally, the
standard of care should be revised from the accepted and
prevailing medical standard to an examination of the
effectiveness of the innovative health care. This could be
achieved through application of either the respectable minority
or "error of judgment" doctrines.
On a legislative level, the proposals for reform are intended
to provide clear guidance and direction to the BPMC and the
courts to reaffirm the guarantee of legitimate due process to
nonconventional physicians and to safeguard the freedom of
patients to choose their own medical treatments. The legislative
proposals should better define the following: (1) the right of
physicians to use whatever medical care that effectively treats
their patients, (2) the requirement of the use of nonconventional
medical experts who evaluate the clinical practices of targeted
physicians who use innovative medicine, (3) the meaning of
"constructive participation" by the two nonconventional
physicians on the BPMC, and (4) the standard of care applicable
to physicians who use innovative medicine. Both the judicial
and legislative proposals will help to better align New York State
medical care with the twenty-first century trend of integrative
health care.

290

Supra note 86.

